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3 - Properties and Relations

Brian Ellis
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne
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Summary

Introduction

To describe things in English, or in any other language, we must refer and classify. We may refer to things by naming, describing, or pointing to them, or by using a combination of these techniques. We may then describe them, or describe them further, by saying what they are like, or what they do, or something of the sort, and in doing so we inevitably classify them. The classifications that we make may have any of a number of different bases. Sometimes we classify things on the basis of some perceived similarity; “… is red” and “… is round” are two such classificatory expressions. Sometimes our classifications depend on some known similarity of function. The predicates “… is a table” and “… is a chair” are descriptive phrases used to classify things according to their functional roles. Sometimes things are classified according to what they do – when we say, for example, that someone is a professor or a butcher. Sometimes we classify things not according to what they are, or what they do, but, rather, according to what they are not, for example when we say of something that it is colourless, or non-English. There are many different techniques for securing reference, and there are probably hundreds of different bases for classifying things.

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Philosophy of Nature
A Guide to the New Essentialism
, pp. 39 - 58
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2002

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  • Properties and Relations
  • Brian Ellis, University of Melbourne
  • Book: Philosophy of Nature
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653416.004
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  • Properties and Relations
  • Brian Ellis, University of Melbourne
  • Book: Philosophy of Nature
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653416.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Properties and Relations
  • Brian Ellis, University of Melbourne
  • Book: Philosophy of Nature
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653416.004
Available formats
×