The dispute between situationism and virtue theory has the appearance of a duck–rabbit problem – the problem being that you cannot see both the duck and the rabbit at one and the same time. Either the situationists are right and there are no character traits, only situations in which people pursue goals, policies, and strategies in convergent ways, or else they are wrong and there are character traits. If Sosa is right, and I think he is, this appearance is an illusion, and the illusion derives from the situationists' way of posing the issue. Thus Harman writes that “[e]mpirical studies designed to test whether people behave differently in ways that might reflect their having different character traits have failed to find relevant differences” and so “ordinary attributions of character traits to people may be deeply misguided, and it may even be the case that there is no such thing as character.” If that is so, then “there is no such thing as character building.” (Harman 1998–99: 328) Indeed the thought that children may need moral education may be as misplaced as the thought they need to be taught their first language. And Doris writes: “To put things crudely, people typically lack character” (1998: 506). In short, although people routinely explain the actions of others by appeal to robust character traits, there is no scientific evidence for the existence of the sorts of traits that people standardly attribute to others.