Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T17:58:40.992Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Physicalism and the Human Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

David Papineau
Affiliation:
King's College London Department of Philosophy
C. Mantzavinos
Affiliation:
Witten/Herdecke University
Get access

Summary

Introduction

We are all physicalists now. It was not always so. One hundred years ago most educated thinkers had no doubt that non-physical processes occurred within living bodies and intelligent minds. Nor was this an anti-scientific stance: the point would have been happily agreed by most practicing scientists of the time. Yet nowadays anybody who says that minds and bodies involve non-physical processes is regarded as a crank. This is a profound intellectual shift. In this chapter I want to explore its methodological implications for the human sciences. I do not think that these have been adequately appreciated.

It is sometimes suggested that the modern enthusiasm for physicalism is some kind of intellectual fad, fanned by the great successes of physical science during the twentieth century. But this underestimates the underpinnings of contemporary physicalism. The reason that scientists one hundred years ago were happy to countenance non-physical processes is that nothing in the basic principles of mechanics ruled them out. Mechanics tells us how material bodies respond to forces, but says little about what forces exist. Prior to the twentieth century, orthodox scientists countenanced a far wider range of independent forces than are admitted today: these included not only separate chemical, cohesive, and frictional forces, but also special vital and nervous forces. Consider the term “nervous energy.” This was originally a nineteenth-century term for the potential energy of the nervous force field.

Type
Chapter
Information
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice
, pp. 103 - 123
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Block, N. 1997. “Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back.” In Tomberlin, J. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 11: 107–132.
Brigandt, I. and Griffiths, P. 2007. “The importance of homology for biology and philosophy,” Biology and Philosophy 22: 633–641.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charles, , D. and Lennon, K. 1992. Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 1974. “Special sciences: Or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis,” Synthese 28: 77–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 1997. “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years.” In Tomberlin, J. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 11: 149–164.Google Scholar
Kim, , J. 1992. “Multiple realizability and the metaphysics of reduction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macdonald, C. and Macdonald, G. (eds.) (forthcoming). Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macdonald, G. 1992. “Reduction and Evolutionary Biology”, In Charles, and Lennon, 1992.
Mameli, M. and Papineau, D. 2006. “The new nativism: A commentary on Gary Marcus's The Birth of the Mind,” Biology and Philosophy 21: 559–573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. 1999. “Historical kinds and the ‘special sciences’,” Philosophical Studies 95: 45–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, E. 1961. The Structure of Science. New York, NY: Harcourt.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. 1985. “Social Facts and Psychological Facts.” In Currie, G. and Musgrave, A. (eds.) Popper and the Human Sciences. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, pp. 57–71.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. 1992. “Irreducibility and Teleology.” In Charles, and Lennon, 1992.
Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. 2002. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuels, R. 2002. “Nativism in cognitive science,” Mind and Language 17: 233–265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×