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13 - Regulatory Responses to the Financial Crises of the Great Depression

Britain, France, and the United States

from Part IV - Case Studies of Financial Crises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2017

Edward J. Balleisen
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Lori S. Bennear
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Kimberly D. Krawiec
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Jonathan B. Wiener
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
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Summary

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Type
Chapter
Information
Policy Shock
Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises
, pp. 347 - 348
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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