In this chapter we analyze the generality norm as it might act to constrain political interferences with trade or exchange, whether such interferences are promotive or restrictive in purpose and whether trade is exclusively among citizens (internal or domestic) or between citizens and persons or firms in other political jurisdictions (external or foreign).

The thrust of the argument is dramatic in its demonstration that any interference with market allocation that is exclusively motivated by political purpose must reflect a violation of the generality norm. This result, in its turn, implies that the precise decision rule for making political choices becomes irrelevant if a constitutional requirement for generality is in place. Majoritarian politics is, of course, systemically organized to produce departures from generality in treatment among groups, but if all departures from generality are prohibited by effective constitutional constraint, majority decision rules operate much as alternative rules in maintaining emergent market allocation. The economists’ normative argument in support of the superior efficiency of resource allocation generated in nonpoliticized markets is reinforced by the argument concerning the political efficacy of the generality norm. This norm, if operative as a constitutional constraint, ensures that the “all-encompassing interest,” reflected in the maximal value of produce, as evaluated by the preferences of participants and subject to the transfer proviso discussed later, will be chosen as preferred by any coalition in a position of collective authority. In effect, the constitutionalization of generality in treatment indirectly amounts to the constitutionalization of market allocation in settings in which public goods and externalities are not present.