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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 March 2020

Paasha Mahdavi
Paasha Mahdavi
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Power Grab
Political Survival through Extractive Resource Nationalization
 , pp. 226 - 243
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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  • Bibliography
  • Paasha Mahdavi, University of California, Santa Barbara
  • Book: Power Grab
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