Even when they are besieged by accusations and protests, presidents may avoid an impeachment if they can rely on loyal legislators. In this chapter, I explore how scandals and public outrage were translated into legislative action against the executive. Under ideal conditions, members of Congress would impeach the president only if there were sufficient proof of a “high crime,” and would refrain from doing so if accusations were merely grounded in partisan or personal motivations. In reality, however, legislators are hardly able to detach themselves from the broader social and political context in which a presidential crisis takes place (Kada 2000; 2003b, 148–149). On the one hand, a partisan Congress may protect the chief executive even when – as in the case of Colombia – there are important reasons to pursue an in-depth investigation. On the other hand, legislators may press charges against the president even when there is no real proof or public sentiment in favor of impeachment – as in the cases of Panama in 1955 and the United States in 1998.

This issue is crucial for the credibility of Congress as a democratic institution. As a collective body, Congress should act in ways that strengthen its credibility and public standing. Individual legislators, however, may encounter personal incentives that run counter to this collective course of action (see Mayhew 1974).