Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vpsfw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T23:09:50.567Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

12 - More or Less

Searching for Regulatory Balance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2011

By
Bruce E. Cain
Edited by
Guy-Uriel E. Charles ,
Heather K. Gerken  and
Michael S. Kang
Bruce E. Cain
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
Guy-Uriel E. Charles
Affiliation:
Duke Law School
Heather K. Gerken
Affiliation:
Yale Law School
Michael S. Kang
Affiliation:
Emory University, Atlanta
Get access

Summary

The existence of a broad consensus about core democratic features and values creates a basic reform template for democratizing authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. But because there is far less theoretical or political agreement about the relative merits of different forms of democratic representation and governance, there is no simple guide for improving established democracies. Democratic political institutions and practices have changed considerably over time and vary widely beyond the most basic attributes. Consequently, there is no international consensus about which country is the most democratic, which means that there are several perfectly acceptable alternative paths for emerging democracies to follow. This poses no serious problem for world peace and harmony, but it greatly complicates political reform in the United States. Simply put, it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate purported reform efforts absent a single, agreed-on democratic ideal form.

All democracies are based on the principle of popular sovereignty (i.e., that power resides in the people), but there is no universal consensus in the United States or internationally about what this means. Is direct voter control more democratic than representative government? Do less restrictive voter eligibility rules always make a system more democratic? Which rule for collective decisions is best: unanimity, supermajority, or a mere plurality of citizens? Are proportional seat allocation rules superior to single-member, simple plurality rules? Should popular sovereignty be limited for the sake of minority rights and fairness?

Type
Chapter
Information
Race, Reform, and Regulation of the Electoral Process
Recurring Puzzles in American Democracy
 , pp. 263 - 286
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Fougere, Josh and Nathaniel, Persily, “Partisanship, Public Opinion and Redistricting,” this volume, p. 228.
Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, William, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.Google Scholar
Cain, Bruce, “New Forms of Democracy? Reform and Transformation of Democratic Institutions,” in Cain, Bruce E., Dalton, Russell J. and Scarrow, Susan E., eds., Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, pp. 1–20, 2003.
Cain, Bruce E., Apollonio, Dorie and Drutman, Lee, “Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm,” 36 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 13, 2008.Google Scholar
Cain, Bruce E., Frederick, Douzet and Lefebvre, Hugo, “La Nouvelle Carte Politique des Etats-Unis,” Herodote, 1, n132, 2009.Google Scholar
Cain, Bruce E., Gash, Alison and Oleszek, Mark, “Conflict of Interest Legislation in the United States: Origins, Evolutions and Inter-Branch Differences,” in Conflict of Interest and Public Life: Cross-National Perspectives, Christine Trost and Alison Gash, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.Google Scholar
Campbell, Angus, Converse, Phillip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.Google Scholar
Dahl, Robert A.A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, Chapter 4.Google Scholar
Dalton, Russell and Gray, Mark, “Expanding the Electoral Marketplace,” in Cain, Bruce E., Dalton, Russell, and Scarrow, Susan, eds., Democracy Transformed? New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.Google Scholar
Elmendorf, Chris, “Empirical Legitimacy and Election Law,” this volume, p. 129.
Fabbrini, Sergio, Compound Democracies, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishkin, James, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.Google Scholar
Foley, Ned, “Democracy in the United States, 2020 and Beyond,” this volume, p. 220.
Fung, Archon, “Popular Election Monitoring,” this volume, p. 194.
Garrett, Elizabeth, “Hybrid Democracy.” 73 George Washington University Law Review 1096, 2005.
Gerber, Alan, “New Directions in the Study of Voter Mobilization,” this volume, p. 184.
Gerken, Heather and Michael, Kang, “An Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship,” this volume, p. 91.
Hasen, Richard L., The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v Carr to Bush v Gore, New York: New York University Press, 2003.Google Scholar
Hasen, Richard L., “Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,” 92 Minnesota Law Review, 2008.
Hasen, Richard L., “Judges as Political Regulators,” this volume, p. 109, 112.
Hutchings, Vincent, Wong, Cara, Jackson, James and Brown, Ronald, “Whose Side Are You On? Perceptions of Competitive Threat in a Multi-Racial Context,” this volume, p. 71.
Issacharoff, Samuel, “Constitutional Courts and the Boundaries of Democracy,” this volume, p. 153.
Issacharoff, Samuel and Karlan, Pamela S., “The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,” 77 Texas Law Review1705, 1999.Google Scholar
Issacharoff, Samuel and Pildes, Richard H., “Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process,” Stanford Law Review, 643 (1998), 567.Google Scholar
Jackman, Robert, “Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies,” American Political Science Review, 81, n2 (1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Karlan, Pamela, “The Second Reconstruction, the Third Reconstruction and the Reconstruction of Voting Rights,” this volume, p. 46.
Mayer, Kenneth, Werner, Timothy and Williams, Amanda, “Do Public Funding Programs Enhance Electoral Competition?” in McDonald, Michael P. and Samples, John, eds., The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.Google Scholar
Pildes, Richard, “Voting Rights: The Next Generation,” this volume, p. 24.
Polsby, Nelson, The Consequences of Party Reform, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.Google Scholar
Stark, Andrew, Conflict of Interest in American Public Life, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.Google Scholar
Trost, Christine and Gash, Allison, Conflict of Interest and Public Life: Cross-national Perspectives, New York:Cambridge University Press, 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×