Book contents
- Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
- Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 New Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- Part I Conceptual, Normative, and Empirical Issues
- Part II Case Studies
- 6 The Difference Power Diffusion Makes
- 7 Democratic Constitutional Replacements and Majoritarian Politics
- 8 Thailand’s Democratic Moment
- 9 Political Elites and the People
- 10 The Anatomy of Constitution Making
- Index
- References
7 - Democratic Constitutional Replacements and Majoritarian Politics
The Cases of Poland (1993–1997) and Hungary (2010–2011)
from Part II - Case Studies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 August 2020
Edited by
Book contents
- Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
- Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 New Constitutions in Democratic Regimes
- Part I Conceptual, Normative, and Empirical Issues
- Part II Case Studies
- 6 The Difference Power Diffusion Makes
- 7 Democratic Constitutional Replacements and Majoritarian Politics
- 8 Thailand’s Democratic Moment
- 9 Political Elites and the People
- 10 The Anatomy of Constitution Making
- Index
- References
Summary
In both Poland and Hungary new constitutions were adopted after elections that provided a new government with the formal capacity to control the process by excluding opposition interests. However, whereas in Poland the constitution was in the end the result of a compromise among a plurality of political interests, in Hungary the government unilaterally imposed the constitution with negative consequences for the future of democracy in the country. In this chapter, we argue that a more consensual constitution-making process was possible in Poland because opposition forces, in spite of their meager results in terms of parliamentary representation, were able to exert influence over the process through extra-institutional and institutional means. In contrast to Hungary, where opposition groups were extremely weak or discredited, in Poland extra-parliamentary opposition maintained significant support among voters and functioned as an effective political constraint on dominant parties. Thanks to their strength outside formal political institutions, opposition forces in Poland were able to induce incumbents to make changes in the constitution-making procedures that allowed them to have some clout in the drafting of the constitution.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic RegimesTheoretical and Comparative Perspectives, pp. 155 - 174Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
References
Arato, Andrew. 2009. “Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22(August): 427–443.Google Scholar
Arato, Andrew. 2011a. “Orbán’s (Counter-)Revolution of the Voting Booth and How It Was Made Possible.” Verfassungsblog, April 16. http://verfassungsblog.de/orbns-counter-revolution-voting-booth.Google Scholar
Arato, Andrew. 2011b. “Constitution Making in Hungary and the 4/5 Rule.” http://www.iconnectblog.com/2011/04/arato-on-constitution-making-in-hungary-and-the-45-rule/Google Scholar
Bartory, Agnes. 2010. “Election Briefing No 51: Europe and the Hungarian Parliamentary Elections of April 2010.” www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-election-briefing-no-51.pdf.Google Scholar
Bánkuti, Miklós et al. 2012. “Opinion on Hungary’s New Constitutional Order: Amicus Brief for the Venice Commission on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Key Cardinal Laws.” http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/Amicus_Cardinal_Laws_final.pdf.Google Scholar
Bánkuti, Miklós, Halmai, Gábor, and Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2012. “Disabling the Constitution.” Journal of Democracy 23(3): 138–146.Google Scholar
Brier, Robert. 2006. “The Constitutional Politics of Culture. Symbols, Interests, and Constitution-Drafting in Poland’s Third Republic.” PhD diss., Europa-Universität Viadrian Frankfurt (Oder).Google Scholar
Brodsky, Clava. 2015. “Hungary’s Dangerous Constitution.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. http://jtl.columbia.edu/hungarys-dangerous-constitution.Google Scholar
Brzezinski, Mark F. 1991. “Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland.” Virginia Law Review 77(1): 49–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brzezinski, Mark F. 1993. “The Emergence of Judicial Review in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland.” American Journal of Comparative Law 41(2): 153–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brzezinski, Mark F., and Garlicki, Leszek. 1995. “Judicial Review in Post-Communist Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?” Stanford Journal of International Law 31(1): 13–60.Google Scholar
Comments of Hungarian NGOs on the Draft Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary and on the Position of the Hungarian Government. 2013. http://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/tavares_gov_ngos_comments_20130523.pdf.Google Scholar
Chruściak, Ryszard, and Wiktor, Osiatyński. 2001. Tworzenie Konstytucji W Polsce W Latach 1989–1997. Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.Google Scholar
Eisenstadt, Todd, Carl LeVan, A., and Maboudi, Tofigh. 2017. Constituents Before Assembly: Participation, Deliberation, and Representation in the Crafting of New Constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elkins, Zachary, Ginsburg, Tom, and Melton, James. 2009. The Endurance of National Constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elster, Jon. 2006. “Legislatures As Constituent Assemblies” in The Least Examined Branch the Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State. Bauman, Richard W. and Kahana, Tsvi (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 181–197.Google Scholar
Garlicki, Lech, and Garlicki, Zofia A.. 2010. “Constitution Making, Peace Building, and National Reconciliation: The Experience of Poland” in Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making. Miller, Laurel E. (ed.) Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 391–416.Google Scholar
Gortat, Radzisława. 1993. “The Feud within Solidarity’s Offspring.” The Journal of Communist Studies 9(4): 116–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gorondi, Pablo. 2006. “Hungary’s Prime Minister in Trouble over Leaked Recording.” Washington Post, September 18. www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/18/AR2006091800616.html.Google Scholar
Grzymała-Busse, Anna. 2002. Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Herold, Maik, and Wandan, Solongo. 2014. “Verfassung Jenseits Der Konstituante: Solidarność Und Die Politische Mobilisierung in Polen 1993–1997” in Die Verfassung Des Politischen Festschrift Für Hans Vorländer. Brodocz, André, Herrmann, Dietrich, Schmidt, Rainer, Schulz, Daniel, and Wessel, Julia Schulze (eds.) Berlin: Springer, 271–286.Google Scholar
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee. “Documents Submitted to the EP by the Hungarian Government concerning the Draft Constitution Are Misleading.” www.helsinki.hu/en/documents-submitted-to-the-ep-by-the-hungarian-government-concerning-the-draft-constitution-are-misleading.Google Scholar
Kaminski, Marek, Lissowski, G., and Swistak, P.. 1998. “The Revival of Communism or the Effect of Institutions?: The 1992 Polish Parliamentary Elections.” Public Choice 97(3): 429–449.Google Scholar
Kis, János. 2012. “Introduction: From the 1989 Constitution to the 2011 Fundamental Law” in Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. Tóth, Gábor Attila (ed.) Budapest: Central European University Press, 1–24.Google Scholar
Krzaklewski, Marian. 1997. Speech given in the National Assembly on February 25, available at www.niedziela.pl/zaw/archiwalne_strony_www/n10/n10_krza.htm.Google Scholar
Lembcke, Oliver W., and Boulanger, Christian. 2012. “Between Revolution and Constitution: The Role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court” in Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. Tóth, Gábor Attila (ed.) Budapest: Central European University Press, 269–301.Google Scholar
Millard, Frances. 1993. “The 1993 Polish Parliamentary Election.” Representation 32(117): 15–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millard, Frances. 1994. The Anatomy of New Poland: Post-Communist Politics in Its First Phase. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Negretto, Gabriel L. 2017. “Constitution Making in Comparative Perspective” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Thompson, William R. (ed.). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Negretto, Gabriel L. 2018. “Democratic Constitution-Making Bodies: The Perils of a Partisan Convention,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 16(1): 254–279.Google Scholar
Osiatyński, Wiktor. 1992. “A Bill of Rights for Poland.” East European Constitutional Review 1(3): 29–32.Google Scholar
Osiatyński, Wiktor. 1994. “Poland’s Constitutional Ordeal.” East European Constitutional Review 3(2): 42–45.Google Scholar
Sanford, George. 2002. Democractic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2011. “Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution.” The New York Times, December 19, 2011. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional-revolution.Google Scholar
Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2013. “Guest Post: Hungary, the Public Relations Offensive.” The New York Times, April 8, 2013. https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/guest-post-hungary-the-public-relations-offensive/.Google Scholar
Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2014. “Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions Can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (with Special Reference to Hungary).” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 23(1): 51–117.Google Scholar
Szczerbiak, Aleks. 2004. “The Polish Centre-Right’s (Last?) Best Hope: The Rise and Fall of Solidarity Electoral Action.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20(3): 55–79.Google Scholar
Szikinger, István. 2001. “Hungary’s Pliable Constitution” in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume I: Institutional Engineering. Zielonka, Jan (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 406–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Szilágyi, Anna, and Bozóki, András. 2015. “Playing It Again in Post-Communism: The Revolutionary Rhetoric of Viktor Orbán in Hungary.” Advances in the History of Rhetoric 18(1): 153–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tóth, Gábor Attila (ed.). 2012. Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. Budapest: Central European University Press.Google Scholar
Wandan, Solongo. 2014. Making New Rights: Constitutional Agenda-Setting in the Transitions of Poland (1989–1997) and South Africa (1990–1994 [1996]). PhD diss. The New School for Social Research.Google Scholar
Wandan, Solongo. 2015. “Nothing Out of the Ordinary: Constitution Making As Representative Politics.” Constellations 221(1): 44–58.Google Scholar
Wasilewski, Jacek, and Wnuk-Lipinski, Edmund. 1995. “Poland: Winding Road from the Communist to the Post-Solidarity Elite.” Theory and Society 24(July): 669–696.Google Scholar
Wyrzykowski, Miroslaw. 2001. “Legitimacy: The Price of a Delayed Constitution in Poland” in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: Institutional Engineering. Zielonka, Jan (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar