Book contents
- Reforming Antitrust
- Reforming Antitrust
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Antitrust Today
- Part II The Case for Change
- Part III Antitrust Reform
- 7 Taking a Finger Off the Scale
- 8 Rethinking the Consumer-Welfare Standard
- 9 The Antitrust Evolution
- Conclusion Key Recommendations
- Index
7 - Taking a Finger Off the Scale
Revisiting Decision Theory
from Part III - Antitrust Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 August 2021
- Reforming Antitrust
- Reforming Antitrust
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Antitrust Today
- Part II The Case for Change
- Part III Antitrust Reform
- 7 Taking a Finger Off the Scale
- 8 Rethinking the Consumer-Welfare Standard
- 9 The Antitrust Evolution
- Conclusion Key Recommendations
- Index
Summary
For decades, an odd proposition has held sway. That is, we are better off permitting anticompetitive conduct than to prohibit efficient or neutral behavior. One might find that principle doubly strange – perplexing in that we should allow neither and irregular because ties should cut in favor of competition. In fact, agencies and courts often decide antitrust matters within a penumbra of uncertainty. Incorrect decisions are thus guaranteed, and especially so in investigations that yield close calls. But why tolerate, or even endorse in relativistic terms, harm to competition?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reforming Antitrust , pp. 229 - 249Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021