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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2016

Van Jackson
Affiliation:
Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu
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Rival Reputations
Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations
, pp. 205 - 213
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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  • Bibliography
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  • Book: Rival Reputations
  • Online publication: 05 June 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459669.009
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  • Book: Rival Reputations
  • Online publication: 05 June 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459669.009
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