By the end of the 1950s, the question of whether indigenous forces would enable Britain to reduce its cost of protecting the region remained unanswered. At times during the tumultuous mid-1950s, British defence planners and foreign office mandarins had such little faith in the ability of local forces to keep order in the midst of social and labour unrest that they believed no other avenue was open but to rely on the British Army. Even when local forces were judged to have performed well operationally, British observers were quick to point out that they still depended on British military support, usually in the shape of RAF transport and combat aircraft and Royal Navy frigates. Moreover, it was British assistance to these forces that was held up as the most important factor in their efficacy. In this way, local forces should be thought of as complementing Britain’s military architecture rather than replacing it. Whilst instability around the time of the Suez Crisis reduced British confidence in the ability of local forces to maintain order, Britain still wanted to reduce the size of its garrison stationed in the Gulf.