How does eliminating the prospect of reelection affect legislative representation? The question is relevant for two reasons – one topical, the other theoretical. First, it is directly applicable to the current, heated debate in the United States over whether the tenure of legislators at both the state and national level should be constitutionally limited. Reformers have scored sweeping victories, and so far endured remarkably few setbacks, among voters and in the courts, in their efforts to pass legislative term limits. Academics have been significantly less enthusiastic than voters about term limits, but there has been little rigorous analysis of their impact. The second reason for this study's relevance is precisely the lack of both empirical evidence and theoretical firepower in the term limits debate. The problem is that theories of legislative behavior are firmly rooted in the assumption that legislators' primary motivation is reelection. As a result, political science is currently ill-equipped to offer insights about legislators for whom the electoral connection has been severed. This study aims to provide such insights.

Until recently, political scientists have rarely questioned the assumption that reelection incentives drive legislative behavior, largely because tenure is limited in so few legislatures worldwide. In the United States, political scientists and pundits have scrambled since 1990 to predict the impact of the term limit measures adopted in 22 states, directed at both state legislatures and Congress. But none of these limits has taken effect yet.