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  3. The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness
  • Cited by 63
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2012
Print publication year:
2007
Online ISBN:
9780511816789
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816789
Subjects:
Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology: General Interest, Cognition
Series:
Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology
Collection:
Cambridge Handbooks of Psychology
Information

Book description

The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that the time has come when the field may finally benefit from a book that pulls them together and, by juxtaposing them, provides a comprehensive survey of this exciting field. An authoritative desk reference, which will also be suitable as an advanced textbook.

Reviews

"This volume provides readers from many disciplines with the foundation and knowledge to date on the very comprehensive and complex study of consciousness."
--Janet L. Etzi, PsycCRITIQUES

"...the breath of coverage is impressive....a useful resource....In sum, the book displays how thoroughly our dualistically oriented culture's scientific investigation of human behavior is held in the grip of ancient traditional constructs that are imposed on observed events..."
--Noel W. Smith, State University of New York at Plattsburg, The Psychological Record

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Contents

Page 1 of 2

Contents
  • Chapter 8 - Cognitive theories of consciousness
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This introduction provides an overview of the concepts discussed in the various chapters of this volume on consciousness. This volume attempts to survey the major developments in a wide range of intellectual domains to give the reader an appreciation of the state of the field and where it is heading. The development of new techniques has made it possible to treat consciousness in a more rigorous and scientifically respectable fashion. These techniques include electrophysiological methods, such as magneto-encephalography (MEG), and various types of functional neuroimaging, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). There is currently considerable interest in exploring the neural correlates of consciousness. The volume covers philosophical approaches to consciousness from a variety of cultural perspectives, including continental phenomenology and Asian philosophy. It is organized mainly around a broad (sometimes untenable) distinction between cognitive scientific approaches and neuroscientific approaches.
  • Chapter 11 - Metacognition and consciousness
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter traces the development of the problem of consciousness in Western philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks to the middle of the 20th century. The core problem of consciousness focuses on the nature of subjectivity. The chapter focuses on what has become the central issue in consciousness studies, which is the problem of integrating subjectivity into the scientific view of the world. The mainstream view has not long been mainstream, for the problem of consciousness cannot strike one at all until a fairly advanced scientific understanding of the world permits development of the materialism presupposed by the mainstream view. It was the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries that forced the problem of the Christian dogma into prominence. In philosophy, the 1950s saw the beginning of a self-conscious effort to understand the mind and, eventually, consciousness as physical through and through in essentially scientific terms.
  • Chapter 12 - Consciousness and control of action
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter surveys current approaches to consciousness in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The five approaches discussed here include: mysterianism, dualism, representationalism, higher-order monitoring theory (HOMT), and self-representationalism. The chapter introduces a conceptual distinction between two kinds of mysterianism, an ontological one and an epistemological one. At the center of McGinn's theory is the concept of cognitive closure. Traditionally, approaches to the ontology of mind and consciousness have been divided into two main groups: monism and dualism. Most of the arguments that have been marshaled against representationalism are arguments by counter-example. HOMT tends to anchor consciousness in the operation of a monitoring device. One problem that does persist for the self-representational theory is the problem of animal consciousness. The ability to have self-representing states presumably requires all the conceptual sophistication that the ability to have higher-order monitoring states does, and perhaps even greater sophistication.
  • Chapter 13 - Language and consciousness
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter provides an introduction to the philosophical tradition of phenomenology and its way of approaching issues about consciousness. Phenomenology grows out of the recognition that we can adopt, in our own first person case, different mental attitudes or stances toward the world, life, and experience. One can discern certain ambivalence in the phenomenological tradition regarding the theoretical and practical or existential dimensions of the epoche. According to Husserlian phenomenology, consciousness is intentional, in the sense that it aims toward or intends something beyond itself. Phenomenologists distinguish different types of intentionality. Another important part of the phenomenological account of intentionality is the distinction among signitive, pictorial, and perceptual intentionalities. In contemporary philosophy of mind the term 'phenomenal consciousness' refers to mental states that have a subjective and experiential character. The phenomenological analyses of embodiment and perception are relevant to current trends in cognitive science.
  • Chapter 14 - Narrative modes of consciousness and selfhood
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter examines Indian views of the mind and consciousness, with particular focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition. One of the most salient features of this tradition is that its accounts of the mind and consciousness do not posit the existence of a self. One of the most important views of the mind in the Hindu tradition is found in the Samkhya School. The chapter focuses on two Indian thinkers from the 4th or 5th century CE, Asanga and Vasubandhu. It considers Dharmakirti's analysis of the nature of cognitive events. It also examines Dharmakirti's theory of perception, as well as some of his views on the nature of conceptuality and its relation to language. Finally, the chapter revisits the issue of intentionality, showing the complexity of this notion and attempting to disentangle its several possible meanings within the context of a Buddhist account of the mental.
  • Chapter 16 - States of consciousness: normal and abnormal variation
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Consciousness is only marginally relevant to artificial intelligence (AI), because to most researchers in the field other problems seem more pressing. The purpose of consciousness, from an evolutionary perspective, is often held to have something to do with the allocation and organization of scarce cognitive resources. This chapter describes Daniel Dennett's idea of the intentional stance, in which an observer explains a system's behavior by invoking such intentional categories as beliefs and goals. The computationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness ends up looking like a spoil-sport's explanation of a magic trick. The chapter focuses on critiques that are specifically directed at computational models of consciousness, as opposed to general critiques of materialist explanation. The contribution of artificial intelligence to consciousness studies has been slender so far, because almost everyone in the field would rather work on better defined, less controversial problems.
  • Chapter 17 - Consciousness in hypnosis
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter provides an overview of existing computational (mechanistic) models of cognition in relation to the study of consciousness, on the basis of psychological and philosophical theories and data. It begins by examining some foundational issues concerning computational approaches toward consciousness. Then, various existing models and their explanations of the conscious/unconscious distinction are presented. Work in the area of computational modeling of consciousness generally assumes the sufficiency and the necessity of mechanistic explanations. The chapter looks into some details of two representative computational models, exemplifying either two systems or one-system views. Various related issues, such as the utility of computational models, explanations of psychological data, and potential applications of machine consciousness, have been touched on in the process. Based on existing psychological and philosophical evidence, existing models were compared and contrasted to some extent.
  • Chapter 19 - Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: an introduction
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter discusses three classes of theories: information-processing theories that build on modular elements, network theories that focus on the distributed access of conscious processing, and globalist theories that combine aspects of these two. It also discusses cognitive or functional models of consciousness with less reference to the burgeoning neuroscientific evidence that increasingly supports the globalist position. Beginning in the 1980s, a number of experimental methods gained currency as means of studying comparable conscious and non-conscious processes. The metaphor of cognitive architectures dates to the 1970s when cognitive psychologists created information-processing models of mental processes. The general position is that consciousness operates as a distributed and flexible system offering nonconscious expert systems global accessibility to information that has a high concurrent value to the organism. Future work should focus on obtaining neuroscientific evidence and corresponding behavioral observations that can address global access as the distinguishing feature of consciousness.
  • Chapter 20 - Social psychological approaches to consciousness
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter considers three distinct but related classes of evidence: behavioral studies, neuroimaging, and brain-damaged patient case studies. It discusses recent advances in the study of implicit perception, considering the ways in which they do and do not improve on earlier approaches. The chapter highlights claims for implicit perceptual or semantic processing of discrete stimuli, largely overlooking implicit skill learning, artificial grammar learning, or other forms of procedural knowledge that might well be acquired without awareness. It also considers recent arguments about how best to study implicit perception. Claims for and against implicit perception received extensive empirical attention starting in the late 1950s, with sentiment in the field vacillating between acceptance and skepticism. Finally, the chapter discusses how qualitative differences in the nature of perceptual processing may be of theoretical significance even without a clear demonstration that processing occurs entirely outside of awareness.
  • Chapter 21 - The evolution of consciousness
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter describes two empirical movements that have shaped the recent study of consciousness in relation to memory. The first breakthrough can be traced to the reports of implicit memory in severely amnesic individuals. The second impetus came from the distinction Endel Tulving introduced between remembering and knowing. The chapter adopts Tulving's tripartite distinction among three states of consciousness to provide coherence to the review of the literature. Tulving distinguished among autonoetic (remembering), noetic (knowing), and anoetic forms of consciousness, which refer, respectively, to self-knowing, knowing, and non-knowing states of consciousness. One of the most compelling findings from recent studies is that subjects sometimes report vivid conscious experiences (Remember responses) for events that never occurred. This phenomenon has been termed false remembering, illusory recollection, or phantom recollection. Research on remembering, knowing, and priming reveals the systematic responsiveness of these measures to the influence of specific independent and subject variables.
  • Chapter 22 - The serpent’s gift: evolutionary psychology and consciousness
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter highlights that the study of metacognition sheds light on some fundamental issues about consciousness and its role in behavior. It analyzes the long-standing issue of the cause-and-effect relation between consciousness and behavior. The chapter emphasizes the work on metacognition within the area of adult memory research. It examines questions on metacognitive judgments, emphasizing its implications for issues concerning consciousness; in particular, the genesis of subjective experience, the function of self-reflective consciousness, and the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior. These questions explore the bases of metacognitive judgments, validity of subjective intuitions, the processes underlying the accuracy and inaccuracy of metacognitive judgments and strategic regulation of learning and remembering. In conclusion, the chapter comments on how the research on metacognition relates to some of the fundamental issues regarding consciousness and its role in behavior.

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