Chapter 1 sets the stage for my substantive inquiry into the obligatory dimension of the law by asserting that a conceptualization of obligation in general is the preliminary step for constructing a comprehensive theory of the kind of obligation engendered by the law. In a nutshell, the overall strategy I will follow in working towards the objective just set out – putting forward an account of legal obligation – consists in, first, (i) introducing a concept of obligation in wide currency today, and then (ii) critically considering a number of different theoretical accounts of legal obligation that have so far been defended in jurisprudence. Accordingly, Chapter 1 seeks to establish the fundamental characteristics of obligation understood as a conceptual construct with its own distinctive defining traits. In that context, I will defend the view that obligation is best conceived as a practically normative requirement that makes a noticeable and yet resistible claim on us, who in turn are bound to, and accountable for, conforming to it, since acting otherwise would be prima facie wrong.