It was always likely that the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) would be one of conflict, since not only were the two regimes driven by antithetical ideologies but each was also intent on being the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, between 1979 and 1988 events, some of which were avoidable, also conspired to ensure that the conflict between the two would become an exceptionally bitter one. The lack of mutual understanding that had been evident under the Shah's regime evolved into a relationship of pathological mistrust, in which the worst was always assumed of the other whilst the reasonableness of one's own actions and intentions was rarely questioned. The 1980s thus saw the forging of the relationship of profound hostility and distrust which formed the essential context in which the nuclear relationship would develop over the next three decades. Both the IRI's nuclear programme and the American response to it have been fundamentally influenced by this antipathy, both at the elite level and through its pervasiveness in their wider societies. This chapter traces the development of that antipathy as well as examining the decision of the new Iranian leadership to reconstitute the country's nuclear programme in the context of its developing confrontation with the United States.

Before the Revolution

The Iranian antipathy toward the United States that bloomed in the 1980s was borne in no small part from a sense of disillusion. Before the Cold War the United States had been viewed favourably in Iran because of its anti-colonialism. Russia and Britain were Iran's imperialist bogeymen while America was viewed as a potential saviour. That hope was reinforced by American support for Iranian national self-determination during World War II and in the face of Soviet pressure in 1946. Consequently, ‘on the eve of the American moment in Iran, the Iranians held an idealised image of the United States. The expectation was that the Americans would do what they could to allow Iranians to take control of their own destiny.’

Iranian perceptions were changed, and their hopes dashed, by the events of 1953. The American role in the overthrow of Mossadegh is viewed as an act of betrayal by Iranians regardless of their political allegiance. For supporters of the IRI it is proof that the United States is just another ‘imperial’ power bent on exploiting Iran for its own ends.