The image of American forces marching in Paris in 1944 evokes the very essence of what most people think of as a victory in war. Yet in the context of Afghanistan, General David Petraeus said, “This is not a case where… you go home to a victory parade.” His comment raises a crucial point for scholars, policymakers, and the public: what if we live in an era in which some wars no longer end in a decisive fashion? What if the concept of “victory” oversimplifies the range of successful outcomes that wars are meant to achieve? More critically, what if its meaning is so diffuse that societies are confused about what it means to achieve victory?

Despite all the work that has been done on theories and strategies of war, the concept of victory is not a transparent term in the language of strategy, diplomacy, security, and war. Ultimately, what is missing is a systematic framework – a theoretical narrative, as presented in this study – to help us understand what it means to attain victory.

While the term victory is used casually to express a generally successful outcome of a contest, the outcomes of all wars are not equal. Whereas the term can express the concept that one state totally defeats another state, as in World War II, it is also true that victory can express lower levels of success, such as the defeat of Panama in 1989 or Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.