It is often thought that what is distinctive about ethical virtues is that they are meant to remedy certain defects, either in human nature or in the world, or both. These views are supposedly linked with the idea that if human beings were perfect, or if they lived in a perfect world, there would be no need for ethical virtues. In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle's ethical virtues are not essentially remedial. This is especially clear in the case of the nameless virtues I discussed in the previous chapter, but remedial interpretations are also at odds with aspects of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, discussed in Chapter 1, and his famous function argument. The view that Aristotelian ethical virtues are not essentially remedial is therefore an important thesis in Aristotle's ethic of virtue. It contributes to Aristotle's account of particular virtues, to be explained in Chapter 4, and it also supports Aristotle's humanism, to be further elaborated in Chapter 6.

Modern proponents of remedial views often trace their position back to Aristotle. For example, Philippa Foot in “Virtues and Vices” says that the “virtues should be seen as correctives” and she suggests that Aristotle would agree. Christine Korsgaard in an influential paper, “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value”, argues that, according to Aristotle, the ethical virtues only have conditional value. In Korsgaard's words: