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5 - Disequilibrium and equilibrium in the model of monetary oral pledges markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Donald A. Walker
Affiliation:
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

Oral pledges markets, such as securities exchanges, are an important part of the market system, and accordingly were assigned an important role in Walras's models of general equilibrium. His conception of their disequilibrium behavior was an essential part of his wider conception of the functioning of a freely competitive economy. The model of monetary oral pledges markets was fruitful in that major aspects of it were incorporated into the modern theory of competitive markets, but the model itself and the insights that can be derived from examining it have been neglected. Moreover, it has been incorrectly alleged that the features of auction markets can be substituted in place of the ones Walras assumed, without affecting the outcome. This chapter analyzes the functioning of the model, shows that its outcomes are different from auction markets, and identifies its merits and deficiencies.

Introduction

Expressing a view that has become general concerning Walras's model of exchange in oral pledges markets, William Jaffé maintained that Walras neglected their disequilibrium behavior (Jaffé 1981, pp. 327–28 [257–58], 322–23 [252–54], 330 [261]). According to Jaffé, Walras concentrated on equilibrium conditions, developed an analysis that was “consciously and deliberately confined within a strictly statical framework” (ibid., p. 327 [258]), and thus failed to “depict an actual process” of adjustments that traders make in markets (ibid., p. 327 [257–58]). Walras did not mean his treatment of price formation to be an account of “market events” (ibid., p. 327 [258]).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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