In the debates surrounding the events of 1948, Lebanon's role is either exaggerated militarily or relegated to a few footnotes,1 scholars preferring to concentrate on the bigger battles on the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian fronts. While Lebanon was not a major protagonist in the first Arab–Israeli war, the part it played deserves a thorough examination. Such a study not only adds to our understanding of the Arab front arrayed against Israel, but also helps answer the question of why Israel won the war. It is clear that Lebanon had neither the political will nor the military strength to fight Israel in 1948. It was a belligerent in 1948 in name only, leaving the fighting to others. Politically, its Christian-dominated government had little incentive to fight Israel, elements of the Christian community preferring to collude with the Jewish Yishuv before and after 1948. Militarily, Lebanon was weak, in some measure because Christian dominance of the Lebanese army muted its battlefield performance. Thus, the Lebanese army did not cover itself in glory in 1948. It fought one insignificant, symbolic half-day battle at the border village of Malikiyya in June 1948, advancing a short distance into Israel/Palestine, before settling down to await the outcome of the war. As well as debunking any residual Lebanese “heroic” perspective on the battle of Malikiyya, this chapter contributes to the re-assessment of the “David versus Goliath” idea (or “myth”) of the first Arab–Israeli war, finding instead that Israel's military power was superior to that of its disunited Arab opponents.

Lebanon and the National Pact

French mandatory rule in Lebanon after the First World War had helped embed a corrupt political client system in which religious (or confessional), regional, and family interests predominated.