The referendum of 8 January 1961 marked a decisive turning point in the Algerian war. In the metropole, 76.25 per cent approved de Gaulle's policies. So did the majority in Algeria, notwithstanding a high rate of abstentions. The overwhelming vote for self-determination signalled a clear preference on either side of the Mediterranean for the formation of an Algérie algérienne (an ‘Algerian Algeria’), an option de Gaulle had first endorsed in a press conference on 5 September 1960. By relying on the democratic process, de Gaulle had secured the public mandate he needed to prepare for France's withdrawal from Algeria. Thence started a new phase in the war, one marked by the search for a political settlement. A highly volatile period ensued, one marked by political posturing through which both the French government and GPRA sought to gain the upper hand in negotiations that opened in Évian on 20 May 1961. In the context of increasingly violent resistance on the part of the newly formed OAS and growing divisions within the FLN, the negotiations proved difficult, but on 18 March 1962, the terms of a permanent ceasefire were finally agreed. The Évian Accords were hailed as a triumph for compromise. France conceded Algeria's territorial integrity and sovereignty and agreed to provide substantial economic assistance. The FLN's negotiators, meanwhile, pledged to guarantee the rights and property of the colons, lease key installations to the French military – including the nuclear test sites in the Sahara, and accord French firms privileged access to Algeria's oil and gas reserves. Though bitterly contested by French ultras and Algerian radicals alike, the Accords paved the way for Algeria's independence on 5 July.

The closing phase of Algeria's liberation struggle presented new challenges for the Adenauer government, which realised it had persistently backed the wrong side. How, then, did West German diplomacy adjust to the new realities created by the referendum? To what extent did the Adenauer government's loyalty to France endure in this final phase of the war? And how did the new Algerian state take to Bonn's erstwhile support for France? In exploring these questions, this chapter explains how the Bonn authorities ultimately managed to reconcile two seemingly incompatible foreign-policy goals.