From the moment its militants took refuge in West Germany, the FLN defied the French and German authorities seeking their expulsion. Even though its room to manoeuvre was limited, the movement managed to organise Algerians arriving in the FRG into a politico-administrative framework that harnessed them to the war effort, whether as militants, adherents or sympathisers. More importantly, the FLN managed to enlist a wide range of West German civil-society actors, whose aid and support proved vital not just to the FLN's propaganda war but to the security and stability of the sanctuary itself. The previous two chapters have highlighted the extent to which FLN militants, assisted by their auxiliaries in the UGTA and UGEMA, worked indefatigably and successfully to entrench their external sanctuary and promote the cause of national liberation. They did so by hiding behind the law, exploiting the democratic order, and working through local allies, whether Arab, French or German. However, recruitment and political mobilisation only represented two of the FLN's three fundamental tasks in West Germany. To Abdelhafid Keramane, the head of the FLN bureau in Bonn, the third – the procurement of military and non-military supplies – in many ways proved most vital, for the insurgency depended on a steady source of war materiel. How, then, did the governments in Paris and Bonn respond to the FLN's continued procurement efforts? The war on contraband, this chapter argues, remained a central concern for the French authorities, one pursued even more doggedly under the Fifth Republic than under its predecessor. French interventions against the FLN's supply networks became increasingly aggressive and unilateral, so much so that the FRG itself transformed into a battleground in SDECE's guerre d'action. A blatant violation of West German sovereignty, the secret services’ campaign against contraband highlights once more just how unequal and volatile Franco-German relations remained during the Algerian war. It underlines further just how far the French authorities were willing to go in internationalising their counterinsurgency so as to destroy the FLN's external sanctuaries and support networks. The war of action undermined the FLN's procurement activities in West Germany. In the grand scheme of things, this did more harm than good to France's counterinsurgency campaign.