Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-30T15:54:18.494Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2017

By
Claudine Verheggen
Edited by
Claudine Verheggen
Claudine Verheggen
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto
Get access

Summary

A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action , pp. 69 - 96
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Blackburn, Simon. 1984. “The Individual Strikes Back.” In Miller, and Wright, 2002.Google Scholar
Boghossian, Paul. 1989. “The Rule-Following Considerations.” In Miller, and Wright, 2002.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1973. “Radical Interpretation.” In Davidson, 1984.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1974. “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.” In Davidson, 1984.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1975. “Thought and talk.” In Davidson, 1984.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1979. “The Inscrutability of Reference.” In Davidson, 1984.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1990a. “The Structure and Content of Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 87–6: 279–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1990b. “Meaning, Truth, and Evidence.” In Davidson, 2005.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1991a. “Epistemology Externalized.” In Davidson, 2001a.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1991b. “Three Varieties of Knowledge” In Davidson, 2001a.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1992. “The Second Person.” In Davidson, 2001a.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1994. “The Social Aspect of Language.” In Davidson, 2005.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1999. “The Emergence of Thought.” In Davidson, 2001a.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001a. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001b. “Externalisms.” In Kotatko, et al. 2001.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001c. “Comments on Karlovy Vary papers.” In Kotatko, et al. 2001.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2005. Truth, Language, and History. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellis, Jonathan and Guevara, Daniel, eds. 2012. Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fogelin, Robert. 1996. “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy.” In Sluga, H. D. and Stern, D., eds., The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin and Wikforss, Åsa. 2009. “Against Content Normativity.” Mind 118: 31–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldfarb, Warren. 1997. “Wittgenstein on Fixity of Meaning.” In Tait, W. W., ed., Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. Essays in Honor of Leonard Linsky. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co.Google Scholar
Goldfarb, Warren. 2012. “Rule-Following Revisited.” In Ellis, and Guevara, 2012.Google Scholar
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2006. “Is Meaning Normative?” Mind and Language 21: 220–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kotatko, Petr, Pagin, Peter, and Segal, Gabriel, eds. 2001. Interpreting Davidson. Stanford, Calif.: CSLI.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, John. 1992. “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17: 40–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, Alex and Wright, Crispin, eds. 2002. Rule-Following and Meaning. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.Google Scholar
Myers, Robert M. and Verheggen, Claudine. 2016. Donald Davidson’s Triangulation Argument. A Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pears, David Francis. 1988. The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stroud, Barry. 2012. “Meaning and Understanding.” In Ellis, and Guevara, 2012.Google Scholar
Thornton, Tim. 1998. Wittgenstein on Language and Thought: The Philosophy of Content. Edinburgh University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine. 2003. “Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning.” Philosophical Investigations 26: 285–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine. 2011. “Semantic Normativity and Naturalism.” Logique et Analyse 216: 552–67.Google Scholar
Whiting, Daniel. 2013. “What Is the Normativity of Meaning?” Inquiry 56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wikforss, Åsa. 2001. “Semantic Normativity.” Philosophical Studies 102: 203–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Meredith. 1999. Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Wilson, George. 1998. “Semantic Realism and Kripke’s Wittgenstein.” In Miller, and Wright, 2002.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. Harper Torchbooks.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin. 1986. “Does Philosophical Investigations I. 258–60 Suggest a Cogent Argument Against Private Language?” In McDowell, John and Pettit, Philip, eds., Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×