This book aims at exploring the implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy for social philosophy and the social sciences. I should make clear at the outset that I will be particularly concerned with Wittgenstein's later philosophical work – his work from the 1930s until his death in 1951. When I talk about ‘Wittgenstein's philosophy’ I will primarily be talking about the mature philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty rather than his earlier work in the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, that he criticized in the later work. However, I will occasionally refer to his earlier work and note certain elements of continuity in Wittgenstein's work.

According to Wittgenstein (throughout his career) philosophy is a discipline that is not based on observation and experiment. It is not an empirical discipline and, more particularly, philosophy is not a science. This book defends the later Wittgenstein's take on philosophy and attempts to show its usefulness for social philosophy and social science. So, this book is not a work of social science and it will not rely on empirical data about our current or past social and political circumstances. I will not be attempting to formulate prescriptions for, say, politicians, social workers, or political activists based on evidence drawn from observations, questionnaires, medical records, interviews, or crime statistics. The aim is not to provide advice about policy or information that might help social scientists to solve particular concrete problems that concern them. Rather, this is a book that is primarily concerned, as Wittgenstein was, with conceptual matters. The focus will be on examining conceptual matters in social philosophy and the social sciences with an eye to showing that Wittgenstein's philosophy can be helpful in overcoming confusions.

However, although this work is primarily focused on conceptual matters and is not a work in social science, I take it that it is of relevance to social science and that social scientists have something to learn from Wittgenstein. We cannot make a neat separation between the conceptual cartography engaged in by philosophers and the practices of social scientists. In order to produce good work in social science we must achieve some clarity about the concepts we are using. To say something true about social phenomena we must make sense. The kinds of confusions that Wittgenstein was so skilled in identifying in his philosophical work are confusions that are still rife among social scientists.