At this point it is useful to remind oneself that the essential function of all naval administration is to provide the support services, that enable warships to carry out their assigned operational tasks. In the Caribbean this involved protecting British trade, attacking enemy commerce, and carrying out operations against Spanish, and later, French colonies. The first task could only be undertaken efficiently, if the ships were capable of keeping at sea for long periods. As the previous chapters have shown, this was not always achieved. Lack of naval stores, of dockyard workers and facilities, even of seamen, all contributed at various times to keeping ships in harbour. Just how many British merchantmen were lost because of this, or how many enemy ships escaped, is impossible to say. However, no great disaster hit British trade, and by the end of the war, both the French and the Spanish colonies were desperately short of supplies. As far as large scale operations were concerned, while the Navy succeeded in capturing Porto Bello, attacks on Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba failed. But there were no suggestions that any administrative failures contributed to the defeats. It is important that this overall picture be borne in mind, for it puts criticisms of the administration into perspective.

Most of the problems encountered in supplying the West Indies were not new. The islands were small, sparsely populated, and unable to provide the necessary supplies themselves. Even before the war, the Navy had relied upon stocks of all necessities being brought from New England or Britain. The only exceptions were rum and, in Jamaica, fresh meat. The problem of distance, therefore, was not new.