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Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Daniel J. Povinelli Open the ORCID record for Daniel J. Povinelli [Opens in a new window] ,
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ,
Shannon L. Kuznar  and
Mateja Pavlic
Daniel J. Povinelli
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA70504povinelli@louisiana.edushannon.kuznar1@louisiana.eduwww.danielpovinelli.com
Gabrielle C. Glorioso
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA70504. C00304772@louisiana.edumxp1503@louisiana.edu
Shannon L. Kuznar
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA70504povinelli@louisiana.edushannon.kuznar1@louisiana.eduwww.danielpovinelli.com
Mateja Pavlic
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA70504. C00304772@louisiana.edumxp1503@louisiana.edu
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Abstract

Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e271
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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