Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T19:17:41.515Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Knowledge as commitment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Ken Binmore*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Bristol University, BristolBS8 1TB, UK. k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract

This commentary on the paper “Knowledge before belief” argues that it is not only in the cognitive sciences that knowledge should be separated into a separate category from belief, but also in rational decision theory. It outlines how knowledge-as-commitment – as distinct from knowledge-as-belief – can be built into an extension of the economic theory of revealed preference.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aumann, R. (1995). Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 619.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. (2009). Rational decisions. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Binmore, K. (2011a). Interpreting knowledge in the backward induction problem. Episteme, 8, 248261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. (2011b). Can knowledge be justified true belief? In D. DeVidi, M. Hallet, & P. Clark (Eds.). Logic, mathematics, philosophy: Vintage enthusiasms; essays in honor of John L. Bell (pp. 407412). Springer-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuhn, T. (1947). The structure of scientific revolutions. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Samuelson, P. (1947). The foundations of economic analysis. University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Savage, L. (1954). The foundations of statistics. Wiley.Google Scholar