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Theory of mind in context: Mental-state representations for social evaluation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Brandon M. Woo ,
Enda Tan  and
J. Kiley Hamlin Open the ORCID record for J. Kiley Hamlin [Opens in a new window]
Brandon M. Woo
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138, USA; bmwoo@g.harvard.eduhttps://bmwoo.github.io/
Enda Tan
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, CanadaV6T 1Z4. enda.tan@psych.ubc.ca, kiley.hamlin@psych.ubc.cahttps://cic.psych.ubc.ca/
J. Kiley Hamlin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, CanadaV6T 1Z4. enda.tan@psych.ubc.ca, kiley.hamlin@psych.ubc.cahttps://cic.psych.ubc.ca/
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Abstract

Whereas Phillips and colleagues argue that knowledge representations are more basic than belief representations, we argue that an accurate analysis of what is fundamental to theory of mind may depend crucially on the context in which mental-state reasoning occurs. Specifically, we call for increased study of the developmental trajectory of mental-state reasoning within socially evaluative contexts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e176
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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