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Rationalism, optimism, and the moral mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Quinn Hiroshi Gibson Open the ORCID record for Quinn Hiroshi Gibson [Opens in a new window]
Quinn Hiroshi Gibson*
Affiliation:
Global Perspectives on Society Program, New York University Shanghai, Pudong New District, Shanghai, Peoples Republic of China, 200122. qhgibson@berkeley.eduhttps://www.quinnhiroshigibson.com
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Abstract

I welcome many of the conclusions of May's book, but I offer a suggestion – and with it what I take to be a complementary strategy – concerning the core commitments of rationalism across the domains of moral psychology in the hopes of better illuminating why a rationalist picture of the mind can deliver us from pessimism.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e153
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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