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Moral foundations are not moral propositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Daniel Haas Open the ORCID record for Daniel Haas [Opens in a new window]
Daniel Haas*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, School of Arts and Sciences, Red Deer College, Red Deer, AB, Canada, T4N 5H5Daniel.haas@rdc.ab.cahttps://rdc.ab.ca/programs/academic-departments/school-arts-and-sciences/bachelor-arts/ba-philosophy/faculty/daniel-haas-phd
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Abstract

Joshua May responds to skepticism about moral knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral foundations. I demonstrate that the moral foundations literature is not able to do the work May needs. It demonstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefore, May's attempt to defeat general skepticism fails.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e154
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

Haidt, J. (2012) The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Pantheon Books/Vintage Books.Google Scholar
Haidt, J. (2016) Comfortably dumbfounded. In: A very bad wizard: Morality behind the curtain. 2nd ed., ed. Sommers, Tamler, 235–52. Routledge.Google Scholar
May, J. (2018) Regard for reason in the moral mind. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar