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Using the study of reasoning to address the age of unreason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Magda Osman Open the ORCID record for Magda Osman [Opens in a new window]
Magda Osman*
Affiliation:
Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, UK m.osman@jbs.ac.uk https://magdaosman.com
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Abstract

If we accept that societally, politically, and even culturally enlightenment face some serious challenges, can we use this rethinking of theories of reasoning to address them? The aim here is to make a case for building on the work presented by De Neys as an opportunity to advance an applied reasoning research programme.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e135
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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