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Explaining normative–deliberative gaps is essential to dual-process theorizing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2023
Abstract
We discuss significant challenges to assumptions of exclusivity and highlight methodological and conceptual pitfalls in inferring deliberative processes from reasoning responses. Causes of normative–deliberative gaps are considered (e.g., disputed or misunderstood normative standards, strategy preferences, task interpretations, cognitive ability, mindware and thinking dispositions) and a soft normativist approach is recommended for developing the dual-process 2.0 architecture.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
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Author response
Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing