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Individual differences and multi-step thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Jonathan Baron Open the ORCID record for Jonathan Baron [Opens in a new window]
Jonathan Baron*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA jonathanbaron7@gmail.com
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Abstract

Deliberative thinking often consists of several steps, each involving a switch decision. These decisions may be influenced by confidence in the thinking done so far. Individuals may differ in their tolerance of low confidence and thus may arrive at unjustified high confidence too soon, either from trusting their intuition or by bolstering an initially favored conclusion.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e114
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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