Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-21T06:35:16.630Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Knowledge before belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2020

Jonathan Phillips Open the ORCID record for Jonathan Phillips [Opens in a new window] ,
Wesley Buckwalter ,
Fiery Cushman ,
Ori Friedman ,
Alia Martin ,
John Turri ,
Laurie Santos  and
Joshua Knobe
Jonathan Phillips
Affiliation:
Program in Cognitive Science, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences and Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH03755, USAjonathan.s.phillips@dartmouth.edu; http://phillab.host.dartmouth.edu/
Wesley Buckwalter
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA22030, USAwesleybuckwalter@gmail.com; https://wesleybuckwalter.org/
Fiery Cushman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138, USAcushman@fas.harvard.edu; http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/
Ori Friedman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canadafriedman@uwaterloo.ca; https://sites.google.com/view/uwaterloocclab
Alia Martin
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 6012, New Zealandalia.martin@vuw.ac.nz; https://vuwbabylab.com/
John Turri
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ONN2L 3G1Canadajohn.turri@gmail.com; https://john.turri.org/
Laurie Santos
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520, USAlaurie.santos@yale.edu; https://caplab.yale.edu/
Joshua Knobe
Affiliation:
Program in Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520, USA. joshua.knobe@yale.edu; https://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it.

Keywords

belieffactivityfalse beliefknowledgeknowledge-firsttheory of mind
Type
Target Article
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e140
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Apperly, I. A. (2010). Mindreaders: The cognitive basis of “theory of mind.” Psychology Press. http://doi.org/10.4324/9780203833926.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Apperly, I. A., Back, E., Samson, D., & France, L. (2008). The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adults’ performance on a noninferential theory of mind task. Cognition, 106, 1093–1108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116(4), 953.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Apperly, I. A., Riggs, K. J., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C., & Samson, D. (2006). Is belief reasoning automatic? Psychological Science, 17, 841–844.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G. W. (2009). Studies of adults can inform accounts of theory of mind development. Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 190–201.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, C. L., Jara-Ettinger, J., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2017). Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing. Nature Human Behaviour, 1, 0064.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, C. L., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2009). Action understanding as inverse planning. Cognition, 113(3), 329–349.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(3), 110–118.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bardi, L., Desmet, C., & Brass, M. (2018). Spontaneous theory of mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents. Psychological Research, 83, 1571–1580. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1000-0.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). Perceptual role taking and protodeclarative pointing in autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 7, 113–127. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.1989.tb00793.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). The evolution of a theory of mind. In Corballis, M. & Lea, S. (Eds.), The descent of mind: Psychological perspectives on hominid evolution (pp. 261–277). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192632593.003.0013.Google Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S., & Goodhart, F. (1994). The ‘seeing-leads-to-knowing’ deficit in autism: The Pratt and Bryant probe. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12(3), 397–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Barth, H., Kanwisher, N., & Spelke, E. (2003). The construction of large number representations in adults. Cognition, 86(3), 201–221.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1995). Children talk about the mind. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Begus, K., & Southgate, V. (2012). Infant pointing serves an interrogative function. Developmental Science, 15(5), 611–617.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Behne, T., Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Twelve-month-olds’ comprehension and production of pointing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30, 359–375.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bennett, J. (1978). Some remarks about concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 557–560.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Birch, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2003). Children are cursed: An asymmetric bias in mental-state attribution. Psychological Science, 14(3), 283–286.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bloom, L., Rispoli, M., Gartner, B., & Hafitz, J. (1989). Acquisition of complementation. Journal of Child Language, 16(1), 101–120.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Chimpanzees really know what others can see in a competitive situation. Animal Cognition, 10, 439–448.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brooker, I., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2013). Is a bird an apple? The effect of speaker labeling accuracy on infants’ word learning, imitation, and helping behaviors. Infancy, 18, E46–E68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2014). Telling, showing and knowing: A unified theory of pedagogical norms. Analysis, 74(1), 16–20. http://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant092.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, T. (2018). Do infants and nonhuman animals attribute mental states? Psychological Review, 125(3), 409.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Buttelmann, D., Buttelmann, F., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2017). Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task. PLOS ONE, 12(4), e0173793.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112(2), 337–342.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butterfill, S. A., & Apperly, I. A. (2013). How to construct a minimal theory of mind. Mind & Language, 28(5), 606–637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Call, J., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8(3), 151–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Call, J., & Santos, L. R. (2012). Understanding other minds. In Mitani, J., Kappeler, P., Palombit, R., Call, J. & Silk, J. (Eds.), The evolution of primate societies (pp. 664–681). University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1995). The use of social information in the problem-solving of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo Sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 109, 308–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1999). A nonverbal theory of mind test. The performance of children and apes. Child Development, 70, 381–395.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5), 187–192.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Carey, S. (2009). The origin of concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carruthers, P. (2013). Mindreading in infancy. Mind & Language, 28(2), 141–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carruthers, P. (2016). Two systems for mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(1), 141–162. http://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0259-y.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., & Jarvis, B. (Eds.). (2017). Knowledge-First: Approaches in epistemology and mind. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. M. (1977). Theory of knowledge (2d ed.). Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Conway, J. R., Lee, D., Ojaghi, M., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2017). Submentalizing or mentalizing in a level 1 perspective-taking task: A cloak and goggles test. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 43(3), 454.Google ScholarPubMed
Craig, E. (1990). Knowledge and the state of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis. Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0198238797.001.0001.Google Scholar
Dehaene, S., & Cohen, L. (1994). Dissociable mechanisms of subitizing and counting: Neuropsychological evidence from simultanagnosic patients. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20(5), 958–975. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.20.5.958.Google ScholarPubMed
Dehaene, S., Izard, V., Spelke, E., & Pica, P. (2008). Log or linear? Distinct intuitions of the number scale in Western and Amazonian indigene cultures. Science, 320(5880), 1217–1220.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dennett, D. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 568–570.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D. (1989). The intentional stance. MIT Press.Google Scholar
de Villiers, J. (1995). Questioning minds and answering machines. In MacLaughlin, D. & McEwen, S. (Eds.), Proceedings of the Boston university conference on language development, 19, 20–36. Cascadilla Press.Google Scholar
de Villiers, J., & de Villiers, P. (2000). Linguistic determinism and false belief. In Mitchell, P. & Riggs, K. (Eds.), Children's reasoning and the mind (pp. 191–228). Psychology Press.Google Scholar
de Villiers, J., & Pyers, J. (1997). Complementing cognition: The relationship between language and theory of mind. In Proceedings of the 21st annual Boston University conference on language development (pp. 136–147). Cascadilla Press.Google Scholar
Dörrenberg, S., Rakoczy, H., & Liszkowski, U. (2018). How (not) to measure infant theory of mind: Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures. Cognitive Development, 46, 12–30. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.01.001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drayton, L., & Santos, L. R. (2018). What do monkeys know about others’ knowledge? Cognition, 170, 201–208.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Drayton, L. A., & Santos, L. R. (2016). A decade of theory of mind research on Cayo Santiago: Insights into rhesus macaque social cognition. American Journal of Primatology, 78(1), 106–116.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dudley, R. (2018). Young children's conceptions of knowledge. Philosophy Compass, 13(6), e12494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dudley, R., Orita, N., Hacquard, V., & Lidz, J. (2015). Three-year-olds’ understanding of know and think. In Experimental perspectives on presuppositions (pp. 241–262). Springer.Google Scholar
Dungan, J., & Saxe, R. (2012). Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference. Cognitive Science, 36, 1148–1156. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Egré, P. (2008). Question-embedding and activity. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 77(1), 85–125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
El Kaddouri, R., Bardi, L., De Bremaeker, D., Brass, M., & Wiersema, J. R. (2019). Measuring spontaneous mentalizing with a ball detection task: Putting the attention-check hypothesis by Phillips and colleagues (2015) to the test. Psychological Research, 84, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01181-7.Google Scholar
Fabricius, W. V., Boyer, T. W., Weimer, A. A., & Carroll, K. (2010). True or false: Do 5-year-olds understand belief? Developmental Psychology, 46(6), 1402.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fabricius, W. V., & Imbens-Bailey, A. L. (2000). False beliefs about false beliefs. In Mitchell, P. & Riggs, K. J. (Eds.), Children's reasoning about the mind (pp. 267–280). Psychology Press.Google Scholar
Feigenson, L., Dehaene, S., & Spelke, E. (2004). Core systems of number. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(7), 307–314.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Flavell, J. H. (1978). The development of knowledge about visual perception. In Keasey, C. B. (Ed.), The Nebraska symposium on motivation: Vol. 25. Social cognitive development (pp. 43–76). University of Nebraska Press.Google Scholar
Flavell, J. H. (1992). Perspectives on perspective taking. In Beilin, H. & Pufall, P. B. (Eds.), Piaget's theory: Prospects and possibilities (Vol. 14, pp. 107–139). Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Flombaum, J. I., & Santos, L. R. (2005). Rhesus monkeys attribute perceptions to others. Current Biology, 15, 447–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frith, U. (2001). Mind blindness and the brain in autism. Neuron, 32(6), 969–979.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Furlanetto, T., Becchio, C., Samson, D., & Apperly, I. (2016). Altercentric interference in level 1 visual perspective taking reflects the ascription of mental states, not submentalizing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 42(2), 158–163.Google Scholar
Gardner, M. R., Bileviciute, A. P., & Edmonds, C. J. (2018). Implicit mentalising during level-1 visual perspective-taking indicated by dissociation with attention orienting. Vision, 2(1), 3.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, 64(12), 357–372. doi: 10.2307/2024268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. M. (1992). Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind & Language, 7(1–2), 145–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gordon, R. M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind & Language, 1(2), 158–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Disla, D., Steinbeis, N., & Singer, T. (2018). Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds’ but not 2- and 3-year-olds’ false belief-related action anticipation. Cognitive Development, 46, 56–68. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.08.007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, A. F. D. C., Brindley, R., & Frith, U. (2009). Visual perspective taking impairment in children with autistic spectrum disorder. Cognition, 113(1), 37–44.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hamlin, K., Ullman, T., Tenenbaum, J., Goodman, N., & Baker, C. (2013). The mentalistic basis of core social cognition: Experiments in preverbal infants and a computational model. Developmental Science, 16(2), 209–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see. Animal Behaviour, 59, 771–785.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behaviour, 61, 139–151.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding. Cognition, 101(3), 495–514.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harman, G. (1978). Studying the chimpanzee's theory of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 576–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harris, P. L., Bartz, D. T., & Rowe, M. L. (2017a). Young children communicate their ignorance and ask questions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(30), 7884–7891.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harris, P. L., & Corriveau, K. H. (2014). Learning from testimony about religion and science. In Robinson, E. & Einav, S. (Eds.), Trust and skepticism: Children's selective learning from testimony (pp. 28–41). Psychology Press.Google Scholar
Harris, P. L., Koenig, M. A., Corriveau, K. H., & Jaswal, V. K. (2018). Cognitive foundations of learning from testimony. Annual Review of Psychology, 69, 251–273.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harris, P. L., Ronfard, S., & Bartz, D. (2017b). Young children's developing conception of knowledge and ignorance: Work in progress. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14(2), 221–232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harris, P. L., Yang, B., & Cui, Y. (2017c). ‘I don't know’: Children's early talk about knowledge. Mind & Language, 32(3), 283–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2015). The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smarter. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hermes, J., Behne, T., Bich, A. E., Thielert, C., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Children's selective trust decisions: Rational competence and limiting performance factors. Developmental Science, 21(2), e12527.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Heyes, C. (2014a). False belief in infancy: A fresh look. Developmental Science, 17(5), 647–659.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heyes, C. (2014b). Submentalizing: I am not really reading your mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9(2), 131–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heyes, C. (2016). Who knows? Metacognitive social learning strategies. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(3), 204–213.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Heyes, C. (2017). Apes submentalise. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(1), 1–2.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Heyes, C. (2018). Cognitive gadgets: The cultural evolution of thinking. Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hintikka, J. (1975). Different constructions in terms of the basic epistemological verbs: A survey of some problems and proposals. In The intensions of intentionality and other new models for modalities (pp. 1–25). D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hobson, R. P. (1984). Early childhood autism and the question of egocentrism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 14(1), 85–104.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Horschler, D. J., Santos, L. R., & MacLean, E. L. (2019). Do non-human primates really represent others’ ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis. Cognition, 190, 72–80.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ichikawa, J. J., & Steup, M. (2017). The analysis of knowledge. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved August 20, 2017, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/knowledge-analysis.Google Scholar
Johnson, C. N., & Maratsos, M. P. (1977). Early comprehension of mental verbs: Think and know. Child Development, 48, 1743–1747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jordan, K. E., & Brannon, E. M. (2006). A common representational system governed by Weber's law: Nonverbal numerical similarity judgments in 6-year-olds and Rhesus Macaques. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 95(3), 215–229.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe. Cognition, 109, 224–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kammermeier, M., & Paulus, M. (2018). Do action-based tasks evidence false-belief understanding in young children? Cognitive Development, 46, 31–39. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.11.004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kano, F., Krupenye, C., Hirata, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2017). Submentalizing cannot explain belief-based action anticipation in apes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(9), 633–634. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.011.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kano, F., Krupenye, C., Hirata, S., Tomonaga, M., & Call, J. (2019). Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent's action in a false-belief test. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(42), 20904–20909.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Karg, K., Schmelz, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2015). The goggles experiment: Can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see? Animal Behaviour, 105, 211–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Karttunen, L. (1977). Syntax and semantics of questions. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1, 3–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaufman, E. L., Lord, M. W., Reese, T. W., & Volkmann, J. (1949). The discrimination of visual number. The American Journal of Psychology, 62(4), 498–525. doi: 10.2307/1418556.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kim, G., & Kwak, K. (2011). Uncertainty matters: Impact of stimulus ambiguity on infant social referencing. Infant and Child Development, 20(5), 449–463.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiparksy, P., & Kiparksy, C. (1970). Fact. In Bierwisch, M. & Heidolph, K. (Eds.), Progress in linguistics: A collection of papers (pp. 143–173). Mouton & Co. N.V. Publishers.Google Scholar
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust ignorant and inaccurate speakers. Child Development, 76(6), 1261–1277.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Koenig, M. A., & McMyler, B. (2019). Testimonial knowledge: Understanding the evidential, uncovering the interpersonal. In Fricker, M., Graham, P., Henderson, D., Pederson, N., Wyatt, J. (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of social epistemology (pp. 103–114). Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kovács, Á. M., Tauzin, T., Téglás, E., Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2014). Pointing as epistemic request: 12-month-olds point to receive new information. Infancy, 19(6), 543–557.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kovács, Á. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The social sense: Susceptibly to others’ beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330, 1830–1834.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krachun, C., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009). A competitive nonverbal false belief task for children and apes. Developmental Science, 12(4), 521–535.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Krupenye, C., Kano, F., Hirata, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. Science, 354(6308), 110–114.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Krupenye, C., Kano, F., Hirata, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2017). A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes’ performance in a false belief task inanimate control. Communicative & Integrative Biology, 10(4), e1343771.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kulke, L., Johannsen, J., & Rakoczy, H. (2019). Why can some implicit Theory of Mind tasks be replicated and others cannot? A test of mentalizing versus submentalizing accounts. PloS One, 14(3), e0213772–e0213772. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213772.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kulke, L., Wübker, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Is implicit theory of mind real but hard to detect? Testing adults with different stimulus materials. Royal Society Open Science, 6(7), 190068.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leekam, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Perrett, D., Milders, M., & Brown, S. (1997). Eye-direction detection: A dissociation between geometric and joint attention skills in autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 15(1), 77–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leslie, A. M., Friedman, O., & German, T. P. (2004). Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(12), 528–533.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1988). Autistic children's understanding of seeing, knowing and believing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 6, 315–324. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.1988.tb01104.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4), 549–567. doi: 10.1080/00048409612347521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, S., Hacquard, V., & Lidz, J. (2012). The semantics and pragmatics of belief reports in preschoolers. Semantics and Linguistic Theory, 22, 247–267.Google Scholar
Locke, J. (1689/1975). In Nidditch, P. H. (Ed.), An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Low, J., & Edwards, K. (2018). The curious case of adults’ interpretations of violation-of-expectation false belief scenarios. Cognitive Development, 46, 86–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Low, J., & Watts, J. (2013). Attributing false beliefs about object identity reveals a signature blind spot in humans’ efficient mind-reading system. Psychological Science, 24(3), 305–311.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Luo, Y. (2011). Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs? Cognition, 121(3), 289–298.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Luo, Y., & Baillargeon, R. (2007). Do 12.5-month-old infants consider what objects others can see when interpreting their actions? Cognition, 105(3), 489–512.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Luo, Y., & Johnson, S. C. (2009). Recognizing the role of perception in action at 6 months. Developmental Science, 12(1), 142–149.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D., Chatterjee, A., Karasawa, K., Struchiner, N., … Hashimoto, T. (2017). Gettier across cultures. Noûs, 51(3), 645–664.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacLean, E. L., & Hare, B. (2012). Bonobos and chimpanzees infer the target of another's attention. Animal Behaviour, 83(2), 345–353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mar, R. A., Tackett, J. L., & Moore, C. (2010). Exposure to media and theory-of-mind development in preschoolers. Cognitive Development, 25(1), 69–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marshall, J., Gollwitzer, A., & Santos, L. R. (2018). Does altercentric interference rely on mentalizing?: Results from two level-1 perspective-taking tasks. PLOS ONE, 13(3), e0194101.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Marticorena, D. C. W., Ruiz, A. M., Mukerji, C., Goddu, A., & Santos, L. R. (2011). Monkeys represent others’ knowledge but not their beliefs. Developmental Science, 14(6), 1406–1416. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01085.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, A. (2019). Belief representation in great apes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(12), 985–986.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Martin, A., Onishi, K. H., & Vouloumanos, A. (2012). Understanding the abstract role of speech in communication at 12 months. Cognition, 123(1), 50–60.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Martin, A., & Santos, L. R. (2014). The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs. Cognition, 130(3), 300–308.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Martin, A., & Santos, L. R. (2016). What cognitive representations support primate theory of mind? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(5), 375–382.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Melis, A. P., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal visual and auditory information from others. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 120(2), 154.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Meristo, M., & Surian, L. (2013). Do infants detect indirect reciprocity? Cognition, 129(1), 102–113.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mills, C. M. (2013). Knowing when to doubt: Developing a critical stance when learning from others. Developmental Psychology, 49(3), 404.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Moll, H., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2014). Two-and 3-year-olds know what others have and have not heard. Journal of Cognition and Development, 15(1), 12–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, C., Bryant, D., & Furrow, D. (1989). Mental terms and the development of certainty. Child Development, 60(1), 167–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moran, J. M., Young, L. L., Saxe, R., Lee, S. M., O'Young, D., Mavros, P. L., & Gabrieli, J. D. (2011). Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(7), 2688–2692.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Moses, L. J., Baldwin, D. A., Rosicky, J. G., & Tidball, G. (2001). Evidence for referential understanding in the emotions domain at twelve and eighteen months. Child Development, 72(3), 718–735.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Murray, D., Sytsma, J., & Livengood, J. (2012). God knows (but does God believe?). Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 83–107. doi: 10.1007/s11098-012-0022-5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myers-Schulz, B., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2013). Knowing that p without believing that P. Noûs, 47(2), 371–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myowa-Yamakoshi, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2000). Imitation of intentional manipulatory actions in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 114, 381–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, J. (2013). Knowledge as a mental state. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 4, 275–310. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0010.Google Scholar
Nagel, J. (2017). Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution. Mind & Language, 32(5), 525–544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading: An integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and understanding other minds. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
O'Connell, S., & Dunbar, R. (2003). A test for comprehension of false belief in chimpanzees. Evolution and Cognition, 9(2), 131–140.Google Scholar
Oktay-Gür, N., & Rakoczy, H. (2017). Children's difficulty with true belief tasks: Competence deficit or performance problem? Cognition, 166, 28–41.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
O'Neill, D. K., Astington, J. W., & Flavell, J. H. (1992). Young children's understanding of the role that sensory experiences play in knowledge acquisition. Child Development, 63(2), 474–490.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308, 255–258.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pagel, M. (2012). Wired for culture: Origins of the human social mind. WW Norton & Company.Google Scholar
Papafragou, A., Li, P., Choi, Y., & Han, C. H. (2007). Evidentiality in language and cognition. Cognition, 103(2), 253–299.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., & Leekam, S. R. (1989). Exploration of the autistic child's theory of mind: Knowledge, belief, and communication. Child Development, 60, 689–700.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Perner, J., Huemer, M., & Leahy, B. (2015). Mental files and belief: A cognitive theory of how children represent belief and its intensionality. Cognition, 145, 77–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.006.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Perry, S. (2011). Social traditions and social learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus). Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 988–996.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peterson, C. C., Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2005). Steps in theory-of-mind development for children with deafness or autism. Child Development, 76(2), 502–517.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Phillips, J., & George, B. R. (2018). Knowledge wh and false beliefs: Experimental investigations. Journal of Semantics, 35(3), 467–494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, J., & Norby, A. (2019). Factive theory of mind. Mind & Language, 36, 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, J., Ong, D. C., Surtees, A. D., Xin, Y., Williams, S., Saxe, R., & Frank, M. C. (2015). A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010). Psychological Science, 26(9), 1353–1367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, J., Strickland, B., Dungan, J., Armary, P., Knobe, J., & Cushman, F. (2018). Evidence for evaluations of knowledge prior to belief. Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.Google Scholar
Pillow, B. H. (1989). Early understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 47(1), 116–129.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Plato. (380BCE/1997). The republic. In Cooper, J. M. (Ed.), G. M. A. Grube & C. D. C. Reeve (Trans.), Plato: Complete works. Hackett.Google Scholar
Poulin-Dubois, D., & Brosseau-Liard, P. (2016). The developmental origins of selective social learning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25(1), 60–64.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Povinelli, D. J., & Preuss, T. M. (1995). Theory of mind: Evolutionary history of a cognitive specialization. Trends in Neurosciences, 18(9), 418–424.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Powell, L. J., Hobbs, K., Bardis, A., Carey, S., & Saxe, R. (2018). Replications of implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands. Cognitive Development, 46, 40–50. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pratt, C., & Bryant, P. (1990). Young children understand that looking leads to knowing (so long as they are looking into a single barrel). Child Development, 61(4), 973–982.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515–526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priewasser, B., Rafetseder, E., Gargitter, C., & Perner, J. (2018). Helping as an early indicator of a theory of mind: Mentalism or teleology? Cognitive Development, 46, 69–78.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Qureshi, A. W., Apperly, I. A., & Samson, D. (2010). Executive function is necessary for perspective selection, not level-1 visual perspective calculation: Evidence from a dual-task study of adults. Cognition, 117(2), 230–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Radford, C. (1966). Knowledge – by examples. Analysis, 27(1), 1–11.Google Scholar
Rakoczy, H. (2009). Executive function and the development of belief-desire psychology. Developmental Science, 13(4), 648–661. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00922.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapaport, L. G., & Brown, G. R. (2008). Social influences on foraging behavior in young nonhuman primates: Learning what, where, and how to eat. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 17(4), 189–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reed, T., & Peterson, C. (1990). A comparative study of autistic subjects’ performance at two levels of visual and cognitive perspective taking. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 20(4), 555–567.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rose, D. (2015). Belief is prior to knowledge. Episteme; Rivista Critica Di Storia Delle Scienze Mediche E Biologiche, 12(3), 385–399.Google Scholar
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J. J., Andrews, B. J., & Bodley Scott, S. E. (2010). Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 36(5), 1255–66. doi: 10.1037/a0018729.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Santiesteban, I., Catmur, C., Hopkins, S. C., Bird, G., & Heyes, C. (2014). Avatars and arrows: Implicit mentalizing or domain-general processing? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 40(3), 929–937. doi: 10.1037/a0035175.Google ScholarPubMed
Santos, L. R., Barnes, J. L., & Mahajan, N. (2005). Expectations about numerical events in four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, Eulemur mongoz, Lemur catta and Varecia rubra). Animal Cognition, 8(4), 253–262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Santos, L. R., Nissen, A. G., & Ferrugia, J. (2006). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) know what others can and cannot hear. Animal Behaviour, 71, 1175–1181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.” Neuroimage, 19(4), 1835–1842.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schmelz, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Chimpanzees know that others make inferences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(7), 3077–3079.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schneider, D., Lam, R., Bayliss, A. P., & Dux, P. E. (2012). Cognitive load disrupts implicit theory-of-mind processing. Psychological Science, 23, 842–847. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612439070.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schneider, D., Slaughter, V. P., Bayliss, A. P., & Dux, P. E. (2013). A temporally sustained implicit theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders. Cognition, 129(2), 410–417.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schuwerk, T., Priewasser, B., Sodian, B., & Perner, J. (2018). The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: A replication attempt. Royal Society Open Science, 5(5), 172273.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S., & Frith, U. (2009). Mindblind eyes: An absence of spontaneous theory of mind in Asperger syndrome. Science, 325(5942), 883–885. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1176170.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shahaeian, A., Nielsen, M., Peterson, C. C., & Slaughter, V. (2014). Cultural and family influences on children's theory of mind development: A comparison of Australian and Iranian school-age children. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 45(4), 555–568.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shahaeian, A., Peterson, C. C., Slaughter, V., & Wellman, H. M. (2011). Culture and the sequence of steps in theory of mind development. Developmental Psychology, 47(5), 1239.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shatz, M., Wellman, H. M., & Silber, S. (1983). The acquisition of mental verbs: A systematic investigation of the first reference to mental state. Cognition, 14(3), 301–321.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sobel, D. M., & Kushnir, T. (2013). Knowledge matters: How children evaluate the reliability of testimony as a process of rational inference. Psychological Review, 120(4), 779.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sodian, B., Thoermer, C., & Dietrich, N. (2006). Two-to four-year-old children's differentiation of knowing and guessing in a non-verbal task. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 3(3), 222–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to Moore. Noûs, 33(13), 141–153. doi: 10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sowalsky, E., Hacquard, V., & Roeper, T. (2009). Is PP opacity on the path to false belief. Generative Approaches to Language Acquisition North America (GALANA), 3, 263–261.Google Scholar
Spelke, E. S. (2004). Core knowledge. In Kanwisher, N. & Duncan, J. (Eds.), Attention and performance: Functional neuroimaging of visual cognition (Vol. 20, pp. 29–56). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Spelke, E. S., & Kinzler, K. D. (2007). Core knowledge. Developmental Science, 10(1), 89–96.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Starmans, C., & Friedman, O. (2012). The folk conception of knowledge. Cognition, 124(3), 272–283.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Stenberg, G. (2013). Do 12-month-old infants trust a competent adult? Infancy, 18(5), 873–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stich, S. (2013). Do different groups have different epistemic intuitions? A reply to Jennifer Nagel. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87(1), 151–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18(7), 580–586.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Surtees, A., Apperly, I., & Samson, D. (2016a). I've got your number: Spontaneous perspective-taking in an interactive task. Cognition, 150, 43–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Surtees, A., Samson, D., & Apperly, I. (2016b). Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen. Cognition, 148, 97–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Surtees, A. D., & Apperly, I. A. (2012). Egocentrism and automatic perspective taking in children and adults. Child Development, 83(2), 452–460.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Surtees, A. D. R., Butterfill, S. A., & Apperly, I. A. (2012). Direct and indirect measures of level-2 perspective-taking in children and adults. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30, 75–86. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02063.x.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tahiroglu, D., Moses, L. J., Carlson, S. M., Mahy, C. E., Olofson, E. L., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2014). The children's social understanding scale: Construction and validation of a parent-report measure for assessing individual differences in children's theories of mind. Developmental Psychology, 50(11), 2485–2497.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tan, J., & Harris, P. L. (1991). Autistic children understand seeing and wanting. Development and Psychopathology, 3(2), 163–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tardif, T., & Wellman, H. M. (2000). Acquisition of mental state language in Mandarin-and Cantonese-speaking children. Developmental Psychology, 36(1), 25.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Tomasello, M. (2018). How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(34), 8491–8498.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(4), 153–156.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A., & Ratner, H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 495–552.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Träuble, B., Marinović, V., & Pauen, S. (2010). Early theory of mind competencies: Do infants understand others’ beliefs? Infancy, 15(4), 434–444.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Trick, L. M., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1994). Why are small and large numbers enumerated differently? A limited-capacity preattentive stage in vision. Psychological Review, 101(1), 80–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.80.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tummeltshammer, K. S., Wu, R., Sobel, D. M., & Kirkham, N. Z. (2014). Infants track the reliability of potential informants. Psychological Science, 25(9), 1730–1738.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Turri, J. (2015a). Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision. Synthese, 192, 4009–4030. doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0727-z.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turri, J. (2015b). Knowledge and the norm of assertion: A simple test. Synthese, 192(2), 385–392. doi: 10.1007/s11229-014-0573-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turri, J. (2016a). Knowledge attributions and behavioral predictions. Cognitive Science, 41(8), 2253–2261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turri, J., & Buckwalter, W. (2017). Descartes's schism, Locke's reunion: Completing the pragmatic turn in epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(1), 25–46.Google Scholar
Turri, J., Buckwalter, W., & Rose, D. (2016). Actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(3), 212–222. http://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.213.Google Scholar
Turri, J., Friedman, O., & Keefner, A. (2017). Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70(3), 504–515.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
van der Wel, R. P., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2014). Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure. Cognition, 130(1), 128–133.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Vouloumanos, A., Martin, A., & Onishi, K. H. (2014). Do 6-month-olds understand that speech can communicate? Developmental Science, 17(6), 872–879.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wellman, H. M. (2014). Making minds: How theory of mind develops. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of- mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 7, 655–684.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., Liu, D., Zhu, L., & Liu, G. (2006). Scaling of theory-of-mind understandings in Chinese children. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1075–1081.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Development, 75(2), 523–541.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Whiten, A. (2013). Humans are not alone in computing how others see the world. Animal Behaviour, 86(2), 213–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001.Google Scholar
Woolley, J. D., & Wellman, H. M. (1993). Origin and truth: Young children's understanding of imaginary mental representations. Child Development, 64(1), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wynn, K. (1992). Addition and subtraction by human infants. Nature, 358(6389), 749–750.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Xu, F., & Spelke, E. S. (2000). Large number discrimination in 6-month-old infants. Cognition, 74(1), B1–B11.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Yirmiya, N., Sigman, M., & Zacks, D. (1994). Perceptual perspective-taking and seriation abilities in high-functioning children with autism. Developmental Psychopathology, 6, 263–272. doi: 10.1017/S0954579400004570.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zmyj, N., Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Daum, M. M. (2010). The reliability of a model influences 14-month-olds’ imitation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 106(4), 208–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar