The primacy of EU law as framed by the Court of Justice pre-empts substantive arguments of principle that originate in other legal orders. This was accepted and acceptable to the extent that the values EU law contained were at least normatively equivalent to values originated from the other legal orders. In this contribution it is argued that this is no longer the case and that the misuse of the Rule of Law rhetoric justifying the primacy of EU law renders the EU less accountable and undermines the dialogical pluralist essence of EU constitutionalism.

A new legal order has arisen in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) following that country's withdrawal from the European Union (‘EU’). Nowhere are these changes more evident than in the complex rules that have emerged in the fields of freedom of movement and the right to work. In evaluating the new legal landscape, this Article has two overarching aims. The first is to assess the level of protection granted to the right to work and associated free movement rights within EU and UK law, including the terms of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. The second aim is to examine the extent to which those right to work rules are reflective of the status of the right to work as a fundamental social right. It is argued that Brexit unmoors the right to work from EU free movement rules, thereby undermining the normative value of that right, while exacerbating flaws in domestic rules governing access to employment for both national and migrant workers.

This Article interrogates the role of national constitutional courts within the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference mechanism from both descriptive and normative angles. First, I demonstrate that although a clear majority of the constitutional courts submit references to the ECJ on a more frequent basis, differences in individual approaches remain significant. Subsequently, I argue that the core normative attractivity of the questions submitted in the course of domestic constitutional review lies in their participative and deliberative potential. Compared to ordinary courts, constitutional courts are better suited to amplify the ‘unheard’ voices of immobile EU citizens. By counterbalancing the demands of the EU's functional constitution, which is primarily based on the ideals of market capitalism, constitutional courts’ questions may contribute to the EU's capacity to generate legitimate decisions. Finally, I put my theoretical claims in context and analyse the main ways in which such deliberative potential can translate into practice.

This Article provides an empirical analysis of all free movement of doctors cases decided by the CJEU. The aim of the Article is twofold: to provide a ‘characterisation’ of the type of doctors who rely on free movement law, and to make a link between their reliance on free movement law and the concept of medical professionalism. In what circumstances, and with what purpose, do doctors rely on free movement law? And does their reliance on free movement law pose a risk to medical professionalism? The analysis shows that most cases before the CJEU focussed on the expertise and qualifications of doctors. Many cases were brought by groups of doctors or medical professional associations. In most cases, the aim of the doctor's reliance on free movement law was to defend medical professionalism. Nevertheless, some recent cases show that doctors do rely on free movement law to restrict their accountability towards patients or national healthcare systems. Moreover, these cases show that arguments based on free movement law are relied on in a broader range of non-specialised courts or tribunals. This makes it important that national courts continue to engage in a dialogue with the CJEU.

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EU adopted a series of unprecedented ‘massive and targeted sanctions’ against the Russian economy. Whereas the EU has clarified that its restrictive measures are not directed against Russian society, it is has stated that it seeks to ‘diminish’ the Russia economy and ‘cripple’ its ability to finance the war. Such measures recall economic warfare, where the adversary's economy is targeted in order to weaken it and, if successful, would undoubtedly have an impact on Russian people. Moreover, the sanctions have had repercussions on third states and economic operators. Applying the proportionality principle, the article finds that the restrictive measures the EU has imposed on Russia in response to its aggressive war in Ukraine are disproportionate due to their impact on third parties.

This Article deals with selected issues of judicial protection that arise in the context of the sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia and Belarus after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As most cases challenging the sanctions are pending, this Article draws lessons from the previous case law on EU restrictive measures. It explores what aspects of the sanctions escape judicial review, then profiles of external (or formal) legality of the sanctions, of internal (or substantive) legality, and concludes by assessing the overall role of the Court in EU foreign affairs. The discussion shows that the case law in this area of EU administrative law converges to a great extent with other areas of EU competence, but tensions remain in how the Court may impose substantial constraints to executive discretion in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The EU Blocking Regulation intends to exclude the effects of extraterritorial legislation by third countries and, in particular, those of US economic sanctions, to protect the interests of economic actors in the EU. The goals of the Regulation—effective enforcement of EU law and the protection of the interests of EU economic actors—give rise to an enforcement paradox: a lack of enforcement by the Commission and the state authorities. The Bank Melli case not only demonstrates a shift in the enforcement of the Blocking Regulation to private parties but also sheds light anew on the doubts about its ability to protect private interests.

This contribution analyses the current situation of the implementation of the Rule of Law in the EU focusing on three essential aspects: the role of Article 2 of the TEU as a legal paradigm, the issue of effectiveness of secondary law to strengthen Supranational mechanisms for the defense of the Rule of Law; and the thorny issue of the primacy of EU Law in the current Era of European Integration.

Article 19 TFEU's unanimity requirement shares a striking similarity with a two-century old debate on voting and minority rights between the ‘father’ of the US Constitution, James Madison, and the ‘rebellious son’, John C. Calhoun. Madison made majority voting a necessary condition for impartial lawmaking and minority protection in multistate unions. Conversely, Calhoun sought to maintain the racial status quo through advocating for a competing unanimity-based structure. Minority protection in Article 19 TFEU aligns with Calhoun's model. This Article reassesses Article 19 TFEU through the foundational principles of constitutionalism underlying the US debate and shows their continued relevance for contemporary case law and minority protection in the EU. Particularly, it demonstrates, first, that Article 19 offends the impartiality principle of nemo judex in causa sua—no person should judge their own cause—which has long been a leitmotiv in Western constitutional theory. Second, it illustrates that unanimity causes de jure and de facto ramifications for ethnic and religious minorities in the EU. Last, the Article provides a theoretically grounded and comparatively informed argument to aid ongoing attempts for treaty amendment.

Competition policy in the EU and UK is in the process of a significant reconfiguration. Its key postulates, methodologies, and normative goals are being subject to intense discussion and revision. The emergence of sui generis ‘new competition tools’ in the area of digital markets—EU Digital Markets Act and UK Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (bill)—epitomises this trend. The purpose of this Article is to attempt to provide legal theoretical foundations for the new subfield of competition law and policy by systematising and conceptualising these trends into the framework of socio-legal scholarship.

Assessing damages in follow-on actions against cartels that have infringed EU or domestic antitrust law is still in its infancy in Europe. This Article highlights the reasons why this issue has only recently started reaching the courts and analyses the pitfalls and problems courts face when calculating or estimating the amount of loss caused by a cartel to individual plaintiffs. As this endeavour raises complex economic questions, the Article outlines the basic economic approaches to measure antitrust harm and derives general principles from EU law on how courts should deal with economic evidence in follow-on actions to ensure an effective enforcement of competition law.

Security of supply refers to governmental policies that aim to secure the availability of critical products at all times. The COVID-19 pandemic brought to fore the importance of such policies, as suddenly there was an overwhelming need for critical medical supplies that the markets were not able to fulfil. Following the pandemic, the EU has started to construct its own security of supply policy, although lacking an explicit competence for it. This Article shows how competence on security of supply is actually split between the EU and the Member States, and highlights the consequences of this division.

This Article analyses the evolution of the public security defence to justify restrictions on free movement within the EU in the context of the energy sector. Taking the seminal 1984 Campus Oil case as the point of departure for its analysis, the Article focuses on the interplay between public security and energy security and shows two key changes in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. First, it demonstrates how the scope of the public security defence in the energy sector has gradually narrowed. Second, it shows how the public security defence has developed to take into account evolving social, technological, and legal contexts in the EU energy sector. Culminating in cases like Hidroelectrica in 2020 and OPAL in 2021, analysis of the relevant case law suggests that, despite the societal dependence on energy and the ongoing geopolitical turmoil in Europe, the Court of Justice interprets exceptions from free movement in an increasingly strict manner, highlighting the primacy of internal market approaches to energy security.

One of the significant changes in the landscape of international law in recent decades has been the increase in the number of international courts and other forms of international dispute settlement. The EU has pushed for the inclusion of dispute settlement chapters in its trade and investment agreements, it has joined multilateral treaties that include dispute settlement mechanisms, and it has proposed the establishment of multilateral investment court. The Court of Justice of the European Union has shown a more guarded approach in recent years towards international dispute settlement. This article explores the potential ways to address these sources of conflict and allow the CJEU to coexist with other international courts.

The discussion of the need to establish a ‘right to the internet’, ongoing now for over thirty years, has not brought about a clear resolution. Despite the growing importance of online services to both the economy and social life, there is no consensus on the limits of such a right, nor on the need to define it at all—not to mention controversy over its inclusion in the catalogue of fundamental rights.

However, the discussion about the right to internet access in the context of the EU legal system now seems obsolete. This is so, because—not through the direct modernisation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights but as part of new telecommunications legislation—a new subjective right, called the right to open internet, has emerged.

The aim of this Article is to clarify the content of this right and its relationship to the principle of network neutrality. Against this background, recent judgments of the Court of Justice will be examined and discussed. Although closely related to the telecommunications market, these judgments may serve as a starting point for further discussion on the meaning of the right to open internet in the EU legal system, including its relation to the protection of human rights.

EU citizenship, now so central to the European Union's project, remains a highly contested concept in respect of its meaning, its scope, and its purpose. By considering the large body of legal texts and their travaux préparatoires from the 1972 Paris European Council until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, we have explored what the original drafters had in mind in developing the concept of EU citizenship and, crucially, what they did not. The article argues that the notion of European citizenship was seen as a tool to define European identity, and thus to continue the building of the European Union as a whole. European citizenship was thus viewed through a constitutional prism from the outset. The constitutional approach to the concept of European citizenship fed into the wider constitutionalisation project under the Maastricht Treaty and, later, permeated the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. We wish to argue that this focus on the constitutional nature of EU citizenship overlooked the more practical implications of citizenship, such as how to manage immigration flows or the infrastructure changes needed in the host state to accommodate a significant number of arrivals of EU citizens (in particular in respect of housing and social welfare benefits). It took more than 20 years after the introduction of EU citizenship for the Court of Justice to become aware of the practical, as opposed to constitutional, implications of the direction of travel it had pursued. By that time, it was too late for the United Kingdom, one of the countries which had received the largest number of EU citizens; the UK voted by a narrow margin to leave the European Union.

The aim of this Article is to show that the enforcement of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) values vis-à-vis Member States could benefit from the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) also in instances where the current interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR prevents this. This would be the case if the CFR were also applicable to purely domestic cases, eg—but not only—with regard to fundamental rights-relevant violations related to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In this case, the European Court of Justice, which has already partly taken this path recently, could prevent the violation of core EU values. The most important historical challenge to those values in Europe today is the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and democracy in certain Member States. It is the very purpose of fundamental rights to provide answers to such dangers. When one speaks of the rule of law and democracy, one necessarily also means fundamental rights. This Article thus advocates an EU which perceives itself as a complete fundamental rights union. While the traditional interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR had a balanced division of competence between the EU and its Member States in mind, the disregard of Article 2 TEU values triggers a clausula rebus sic stantibus: the neat federal balance can only be upheld if both ends stick to the original promise made. It demonstrates two ways of completing the European fundamental rights union: treaty revision, on the one hand, and reinterpretation of Article 51 CFR, on the other hand. Both ways have in common that only a complete fundamental rights union can establish a system of fundamental rights protection that is uniform and thus equality-preserving in cases where national fundamental rights fail to provide sufficient protection.

Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’) technologies present great opportunities for the investment management industry (as well as broader financial services). However, there are presently no regulations specifically aiming at AI in investment management. Does this mean that AI is currently unregulated? If not, which hard and soft law rules apply?

Investments are a heavily regulated industry (MIFID II, UCITS IV and V, SM&CR, GDPR etc). Most regulations are intentionally technology-neutral. These regulations are legally binding (hard law). Recent years saw the emergence of regulatory and industry publications (soft laws) focusing specifically on AI. In this Article we analyse both hard law and soft law instruments.

The contributions of this work are: first, a review of key regulations applicable to AI in investment management (and oftentimes by extension to banking as well) from multiple jurisdictions; second, a framework and an analysis of key regulatory themes for AI.

This article analyses the financial regulation of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (‘SPACs’) in the European Union and SPAC reform in the UK against the main legal system where the SPAC originates: the US. I argue that the US and financial regulators in Europe have opposing views on SPACs, evidenced by the adoption of two different regulatory approaches. As opposed to a SPAC regulation by business or function and by enforcement in the US, the European Union and the UK are implementing a SPAC regulation by objectives, where general principles of company and financial law inform the SPAC legal discipline. This enormously enriches the SPAC current debate, and sheds new light on the subject.

This article discusses the techniques—‘hallmarks’—that the EU courts have developed to ensure that judicial review remains effective in competition law. These hallmarks can be grouped into three main categories. Some of them concern the interpretation of substantive law, namely the definition of legal tests and their consistent use over time. Some, the need for administrative action to rely on the best available evidence (which comprises both reliance on the expert consensus and the careful examination of the economic and legal context). A third category relates to the scrutiny exercised over the policy statements through which the European Commission chooses to constrain its discretion.