The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

The natural models for English debates on judicial appointments have been from the common law. Although England and Wales remain very much within the common law world and its problems, we are increasingly drawn into a European world, where many of our ideas and standards are shaped by our participation in European agendas. There are important lessons to be learnt from European experience in this area. Based on that European experience, one can see a tension between the desire to give the judiciary greater independence from the executive and the practice of leaving the judiciary increasingly in charge of the processes of appointment and management of the judicial career and, even, of the judicial system itself. These tensions are much stronger in many other parts of Europe and these may serve as useful points of reference. There is an emerging European judicial model to which English debates are now referring, but which needs critical assessment.

During the last decade, the European Union has taken a variety of initiatives that together form a policy on combating racial discrimination. Understandably, legal academics have so far devoted greatest attention to the legislative initiatives, most notably, the EU Race Directive. The Directive is striking, both because of its broad material scope (covering areas such as employment, education, housing and healthcare), but also as a result of the new directions that it introduced into EU antidiscrimination law. Whilst it is certainly the centrepiece of EU anti-racism policy, it is part of a broader policy framework. This includes other, less auspicious legal instruments, as well as various public expenditure programmes. The EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia provides an institutional dimension to the anti-racism policy.

Scientists are quick to admonish lawyers that anecdotal evidence may suggest avenues for investigation, but that it is little more. Conscious of this admonition, I suggest that (1) the American cartel enforcement experience is successful, and (2) its success is attributable to the criminalisation of the offence. This view is shared by others and was important in the decisions by both Ireland and the United Kingdom to criminalise competition offences. Moreover, the American experience underlay proposals elsewhere to adopt similar legislation. After briefly reviewing deterrence generally and the current American model, this article discusses the implementation of a criminal enforcement regime in Ireland.

Maurice Lagrange was appointed Advocate General in 1953 and retired in 1964. He delivered over 80 Opinions in a period of 10 years, covering a wide range of issues. The first 40 or so Opinions concerned the European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECSC Treaty) exclusively, whilst the remainder covered all three Treaties.

Observers of the media policies of the European Union contend that the transmission state principle of the Television Without Frontiers Directive, by ruling out the restriction of transfrontier broadcasts, which are in compliance with the laws of the originating state, has signified the end of the broadcasting sovereignty of the Member States. The transmission state principle is central to the objective of the Television Without Frontiers Directive to create an internal market in broadcasting services. Laid down initially in Article 2(2) of Directive 89/552/EEC, it has been transferred to Article 2a(1) following the adoption of the revised Directive 97/36/EC. The meaning of the principle has remained the same: Member States are obliged to ensure the unhindered reception of broadcasts lawfully transmitted in their state of origin. They only have a limited possibility to derogate provisionally from the transmission state principle, when foreign television broadcasts manifestly, seriously and gravely breach provisions concerning the protection of minors or public order.

On 18 June 2003 the Commission presented its Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive). The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive Proposal is based upon the Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection of 2001 and the reactions to this document in the consultation process as laid down in the follow-up document of 2002. The Proposal tackles the field of unfair competition law insofar as the protection of consumers is concerned.

The internet belongs to that important group of phenomena that require a fundamental rethinking of law and its ultimate change. The rules made for printed media could not be applied to radio or television when they appeared. Traditional regulatory models for electronic communication arguably cannot be carbon-copied into the Internet world. Like other revolutions brought about by science, the Internet does not lend itself to current regulatory models but requires their rethinking.

In broad terms, there are two approaches to returning suspects and convicted persons to the other countries where they are wanted, and would prefer for obvious reasons not to go.

One is what is called in the common law world ‘the backing of warrants’. Here, the authorities of the jurisdiction where the person is wanted issue their normal warrant of arrest, which is sent directly to the authorities of the jurisdiction where he is, who endorse it if it appears to be in order, and give it to their policemen to execute it as if it were their own. The suspect is then ‘lifted’, and handed over to the authorities of the country where he is wanted with the minimum of fuss—the unspoken premise being that the authorities of the requesting jurisdiction normally act lawfully and reasonably, and their arrest warrants can be taken at face value and acted upon unless a strong reason to the contrary can be given.