The nature of the One poses a formidable problem. At the source of procession there is, on the one hand, a discontinuity between the First and derived hypostases, since the One is anything but what it gives, since it is beyond its gifts as absolute transcendence and absolute otherness, and since it forever remains the same in its venerable immobility. But, on the other hand, there is a continuity from the Principle to its begotten, inasmuch as its derived energy is like its image, like a trace ensuring the erotic-dynamic process which is transmitted to lower beings in return for their conversion toward the Highest. Confronting the problem of that apparently irreconcilable duality is the search to determine why the One overflows, what is the nature of that overflowing, and how that overflowing might be at the foundation of procession.

That the cogito is the first truth discovered amidst the universal doubt achieved in Descartes' Meditation I is not what ensures its primacy as a metaphysical principle, i.e., its epistemic priority over scientific knowledge. This primacy depends rather on two conditions which Descartes sets forth in a letter to Clerselier. Meditation II contains the demonstration of the cogito's conformity to each of these conditions, and hence of its primacy over knowledge of nature. It seems, however, that the cogito enjoys this primacy over truths of mathematics and of metaphysics (including the principle of non-contradiction) as well.

The goal of this article is to reveal the primal role played by “use” in Spinoza's Ethics. Contrary to appearances, the concept is not linked only to passivity; it is an essential feature of the reinforcement of virtue toward wisdom. Considering that Laurent Bove's analyses of habit within the realm of imagination leave aside the links with adequate knowledge, this article offers an extension of his interpretation in a completely new direction. The new elements are, above all, a demonstration of the place of “use” in the texts where the shift from passivity to activity is concerned, and a new interpretation of intuition in the example of the discovery of the fourth proportional number. In this example, it is argued that intuition is simply a mechanical habituation to truth, thanks to the repetition of acts of reasoning.