According to a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness (RTPC), the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is completely exhausted by its representational content. Some considerations suggested by Christopher Peacocke raise an important problem for the RTPC. In his recent book Consciousness, where he defends a version of the RTPC, Christopher Hill argues that to solve Peacocke’s problem, visual qualia must be identified with “visual appearances” understood as relational properties of external objects. I raise two problems for Hill’s solution and I suggest an alternative way of understanding visual qualia as visual appearances.

In a recent article (2011), Steglich-Petersen claims to be able to provide a teleological account of the nature of epistemic reasons which (i) avoids the standard objections to this kind of approach and (ii) is compatible with the evidentialist claim that epistemic reasons always trump non-epistemic reasons (assuming there are such reasons). I argue that his proposal is unable to do justice to the idea that epistemic reasons are constituted by the evidence, and more generally, that it is incoherent to hold at once that epistemic reasons are instrumental, that believing the true and not believing the false is what has epistemic value and that epistemic reasons are evidential in nature.

I examine Thomas Kuhn’s work regarding the role played by the concept of practice in the development of his theory of scientific rationality. I outline the epistemological implications of his theory of incommensurability. I then show how the original intuition of a practice-based and social conception of incommensurability is replaced by a more conventional linguistic interpretation. I then examine Kuhn’s solution to the problem of incommensurability and explain its inadequacy. I then show that, ultimately, his failure to grasp the epistemological dimension of practice prevents him from providing a fully satisfactory solution to the epistemological problem raised in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Hume sought to analyse our propositionally-structured thought in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, sensory impressions or their imagistic copies, “ideas.” The ideas of space and time are often regarded as exceptions to his Copy Theory of impressions and ideas. On grounds strictly internal to Hume’s Treatise, I argue that they are instead typical of Hume’s account of the generality of thought. This ultimately reveals the limits of the Copy Theory and of Concept Empiricism. The key is to recognise how very capacious is our (Humean) imaginative capacity to associate particular perceptions by various fine-grained determinable resemblances.

Laurence BonJour has proposed a novel defense of the inductive principle (IP) in response to a skeptical challenge posed by Hume. In this paper, I elaborate and criticize BonJour’s strategy. Along the way, I draw attention to Anthony Brueckner’s criticisms of BonJour’s approach, detailing why they fall short of providing an effective rebuttal of BonJour’s argument. By distinguishing and applying two different kinds of probability assessment to BonJour’s premises, I argue that BonJour’s a priori strategy fails to provide a cogent defense of IP. I conclude by drawing out some implications for a priori attempts to argue for the principle.

In two recent papers, Jaegwon Kim offers an account of action explanation that is agent-centered and reasons-based. I argue that, despite his claims to the contrary, Kim’s proposal points the way to a pluralist view of explanation that might resolve the problem of explanatory exclusion and provide a way for nonreductive physicalists to escape the supervenience/exclusion argument.

A close reading of Georges Canguilhem’s early writings, recently published in a new edition, reveals that at the end of the 1930s, before he became the philosopher of life we know, Canguilhem carried out a spectacular reassessment of Bergson. One must therefore ask what inspired this new reading, since, against expectations to the contrary, the common problem he shared with Bergson does not seem to have been the problem of life. In this paper, I attempt to show how Canguilhem’s new attitude to Bergson allowed him to transfer Bergson’s theory of knowledge over to the field of the philosophy of values, whose object is the unity of experience.

This paper is part of a series of interdisciplinary investigations in literary fiction and aims to identify the illocutionary force of the so-called “non-serious utterance” (Frege, Austin, Searle) of fiction makers on the theoretical assumption that the primary unit of an utterance’s meaning are complete speech acts (Austin), composed of an illocutionary force (Frege) and a propositional content (Searle). Based on philosophical analysis of non-serious and performative utterances of descriptive sentences, I formulate the fundamental hypothesis that the primary unit of non-serious utterances’ meaning is a complete declaration of the form F(in the language game x, P), whose illocutionary point is to create the extra-linguistic event represented in the propositional content of this speech act, in virtue of the linguistic meaning determined by the social conventions of fiction.

This note considers the conceptual part of Sen’s «Internal Consistency of Choice». Amongst the various claims this paper features, two are singled out. A first, negative, claim is that no formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling without exception. A second, positive, claim, is that a formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling only under some assumptions involving preference. Here, the puzzling choices Sen puts forward are scrutinized and it is argued that such a scrutiny leads to question the negative claim, but in a subtle way, so that the positive claim is comforted, even strengthened.

There is still a question about what it means to say that Georges Canguilhem was a philosopher of error. This paper, unlike other work on the topic, investigates archival sources and early texts, up to and including the publication of the Essay on Some Problems Concerning the Normal and the Pathological in 1943, in order to reveal Canguilhem’s early thoughts on error and to formulate the basic philosophical problem therein, as he understood it. This work reveals a partial transformation of his thinking as he seeks to develop this question through the study of concrete human problems.

This paper reformulates the analogy between text and action in Paul Ricœur’s philosophy. My hypothesis is that such a reformulation better contextualizes the tensions in Ricœur’s practical philosophy, specifically between the social and the institutional. The aim is to show that Ricœur’s philosophy is tensional because it’s based on the principle of analogy. In order to think about this tension, we must grasp its true horizon: the analogy of text and action. After outlining this analogy’s genesis, we will see that each of these terms—text, action, analogy—is determined by a “grammar of analogy,” which conditions all of Ricœur’s speeches and has its roots in his interpretation of intentionality.

BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour’s notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called “constitutive awareness of content” from his conception of conscious occurrent belief. But this conception also faces an analogous dilemma with regard to these requirements. Third, his explanatory account faces the problem of representation.

Plato is not serious when he has Socrates deduce that poetry must be mostly narrative with just a little dialogue. Not only is the argumentation purposely flawed, but he also has Socrates purposely obfuscate a key distinction. He then has Socrates pretend to be confused by his own obfuscation. By forcing us to work our way through the thickets of his faulty argumentation, Plato gives us the opportunity to become more deeply involved with the underlying issues and to discover his theme: a good person is one who is stoically indifferent to both bad fortune and good fortune.

The concept of human wisdom is fundamental for an understanding of the Apology. But it has not been properly understood. The received interpretations offer insufficient resources for explaining how Socrates could have been humanly wise before Apollo’s oracle, when he falsely believed that he was not wise at all. I argue that a satisfactory interpretation of human wisdom can be given in terms of “philosophia”. Socrates was humanly wise before the oracle because he loved wisdom—even though he did not know that he did. The analysis is confirmed by its resolution of some enduring difficulties in the interpretation of Apology, in particular, the question of why Socrates continued to search for knowledge he thought impossible to attain.

This article presents a comparative analysis between Georges Canguilhem’s Essay on Some Problems Concerning the Normal and the Pathological, published in 1943 and the English language debate that started in the 1970s between the naturalists and the normativists. Seemingly, this comparison illustrates the opposition between the French historical epistemology and the Anglo-American philosophy of sciences. However, I put into perspective what is generally considered an opposition between the two traditions by analyzing certain conceptual similarities.

Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of life, according to which the living is a normative subject, grounds its epistemology in medicine. Medicine is a technique or an art that aims to restore the individual normativity of the patient. It can only be practiced based on the knowledge and understanding of the life norms, and on experience and values, in other words, on the subjectivity. This explains why the clinic and the therapeutics require a personal relationship between the physician and the patient.

The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. Why is it that, prior to information on the results of a draw, assertions such as, “My ticket lost,” seem inappropriate? This paper is composed of two projects. First, I articulate a number of problems arising from Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the lottery paradox. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory (NDAT), that better explains the pathology of asserting lottery propositions, while permitting assertions of what I call fallible propositions such as, “My car is in the driveway.”

Although Hermann Cohen’s criticist system is opposed to metaphysics or ontology of any kind, and therefore differs radically from Ernst Bloch’s realistic philosophy, it was nonetheless instrumental in the forming of Bloch’s philosophy. The young Bloch took up Cohen’s thought through the ontologizing reading made of it by Oswald Weidenbach. Bloch owes to Cohen the themes of the origin as question and problem, the future as primary dimension of time, and the Idea as hypothesis and practical aim of knowledge.

The central aim of this article is to set out the essential elements of Hegel’s conception of evil. I demonstrate that Hegel understands evil primarily as a moral phenomenon. In particular, he identifies evil as a pernicious subjectivism and hypocrisy that undermines the social and institutional conditions for ethical action. An appropriate understanding of his conception of evil points to the centrality of trust to ethicality (die Sittlichkeit).