1 The EU Commission defines CI as follows: “Critical infrastructure is an asset or system which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions. The damage to a critical infrastructure, its destruction or disruption by natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity or malicious behaviour, may have a significant negative impact for the security of the EU and the well-being of its citizens”, see EU Commission, “Critical infrastructure”, available on the internet at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure/index_en.htm> (last accessed on 25 January 2015).

2 The term risk denotes the possibility that an undesirable state of reality (adverse effects) may occur as a result of human activity or natural events. Risk is conventionally defined as the harm of an event (effect) times the probability of this event. See Renn, Ortwin, Risk Governance. Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World (London: Earthscan, 2008), at p. 1 Google Scholar. Those risks usually refer to hazards which are known and calculable due to past experiences, whereas uncertainty refers to hazards where no probability is known. See for a discussion in the context of risk governance van Asselt, Marjolein B.A., Vos, Ellen and Rooijackers, Bram, “Science, Knowledge and Uncertainty in EU Risk Regulation”, in Everson, Michelle and Vos, Ellen (eds.), Uncertain Risks Regulated (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), 359 et sqq., at p. 360 etsqq.Google Scholar

3 See Hermes, Georg, Staatliche Infrastrukturverantwortung:Rechtliche Grundstrukturen netzgebundener Transport- undÜbertragungssysteme zwischen Daseinsvorsorge undWettbewerbsregulierung am Beispiel der leitungsgebundenenEnergieversorgung in Europa, (Tübingen: Siebeck Mohr, 1998).Google Scholar

4 See Leonard, Herman B. and Howitt, Arnold M., “Acting in Time against Disaster: A Comprehensive Risk Management Framework”, in Kunreuther, Howard and Useem, Michael (eds.), Learningfrom Catastrophes, Strategies for Reaction and Response (New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing, 2010), pp. 18 et sqq.Google Scholar

5 For other systems in Europe, which all vary, see in Dörr, Oliver (ed.), Staatshaftung in Europa. Nationales und Unionsrecht, (Berlin: De Gruyter Handbuch, 2014)Google Scholar; Iliopoulos-Strangas, Julia, Biernat, Stanislaw and Potacs, Michael (eds.), Verantwortung, Haftung undKontrolle des Verfassungsstaates und der Europäischen Union im Wandel der Zeit (Baden-Baden/Zürich: Nomos/Stämpfli 2014)Google Scholar, especially the contribution of Antonio Lazari therein, “State Liability in Comparative and European Union Law”, p. 123 et sqq., discussing three models of fault in the UK, Spain and France; Fairgrieve, Duncan, State Liability in Tort. A Comparative Law Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, discussing UK and France. Markesinis, Basil S., Auby, Jean-Bernard, Coester-Waltjen, Dagmar and Deakin, Simon, Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies: A Comparativeand Economic Analysis of Five English Cases (Oxford: Hart 1999)Google Scholar compare the UK non-liability rule on a variety of policy and economic efficiency grounds with the German and French case law which are less strict on liability. See also Rebhahn, Robert, “Public Liability in Comparison – England, France, Germany”, in Koziol, Helmut and Steininger, Barbara C. (eds), Tort and InsuranceLaw Yearbook, European Tort Law 2005 (Vienna: Springer 2006), 68 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The whole book contains comparative chapter and country chapters on public liability.

6 For a detailed description of this development and the legal implications, see Rüfner, Wolfgang, “Daseinsvorsorge und soziale Sicherheit”, in Isensee, Josef and Kirchhof, Paul (eds.), Handbuchdes Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band IV,Aufgaben des Staates (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2006), pp. 1049 etsqq. Google Scholar, and Bull, Hans Peter, “Daseinsvorsorge im Wandel der Staatsformen”, 47 Der Staat (2008), at pp. 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 See the discussion in the articles of Eric Luiijf, “Governing Critical ICT: Elements that Require Attention” and Peter Burgherr, “Accidents in the energy sector and energy infrastructure attacks in the context of energy security”, in this issue.

8 Thompson, Dennis F., “Responsibility for Failures of Government: The Problem of Many Hands”, 44 American Journal of PublicAdministration (2014), pp. 259 et sqq, at 259.Google Scholar

9 Thompson, Dennis F., “Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands”, 74 American Political ScienceReview (1980), pp. 905 et sqq., at p. 905.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Bullinger, Martin, “Von administrativer Daseinsvorsorge zu privatwirtschaftlicher Leistung unter staatlicher Rahmengarantie”, in Ruland, Franz (ed.), Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats:Festschrift für Hans F. Zacher zum 70. Geburtstag (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998), pp. 85 et sqq.Google Scholar

11 E.g. the problems of cross-border provision of CI in Air Traffic Control: instructively, see the decision of the German County Court concerning the negligence of the Swiss Air Traffic Control Company Skyguide, a partially privatized firm (Zürich) in the Überlingen accident, LG Konstanz, Decision of 27 July 2006, AZ 4O 234/05 H.

12 Adopted in 1986 following the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (entered into force on 27 October 1986, 119 State Parties) establishes a notification system for nuclear accidents which have the potential for international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State. It requires States to report the accident's time, location, radiation releases, and other data essential for assessing the situation. More importantly, liability is also regulated. In September 1997, governments took a significant step forward in improving the liability régime for nuclear damage. Over 80 States adopted a Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (capping private liability) and also adopted a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (additional compensation by States). See for details of how to deal with disasters after they have occurred, but not considering liability issues, Caron, David D., Kelly, Michael J. and Telesetsky, Anastasia (eds.), The International Law of Disaster Relief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Responsibility (Verantwortung) is the broader notion, it may also be political. Liability is a sub-form of responsibility, namely legal responsibility for the damage done (usually via restitution or damage payments). See e.g. Klement, Jan Henrik, Verantwortung:Funktion und Legitimation eines Begriffs im öffentlichen Recht (Tübingen: Siebeck/Mohr 2006)Google Scholar. In international law, the terms liability and responsibility are used differently. Responsibility follows from wrongful acts whereas liability is the term used for liability even if there was no internationally wrongful conduct, e.g. liability for damage caused by space objects.

14 Thompson, supra note 8, at p. 261.

15 German “Staatshaftungsgesetz” of 26 June 1981, BGBl I, at p. 553.

16 German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 61, at p. 149 etsqqq. Unconstitutionality was found due to the missing competence in the Basic Law of the federal level (the federal level competence is subsidiary to the state level). Although the competence article was changed afterwards, hitherto, no new law has been passed. The German Democratic Republic, in contrast, had a state liability law since 1969 which, similar to the Swiss law, discarded with the necessity of fault.

17 See only Grzeszick, Bernd, “§ 47 Staatshaftungsrecht”, in Erichsen, Uwe and Ehlers, Dirk (eds.), Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), para. 1 et sqq Google Scholar. See also Magnus, Ulrich, “The Liability of Public Authorities in Germany”, in Oliphant, Ken (eds), The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, (Antwerp: Intersentia 2015), forthcoming.Google Scholar

18 For an encompassing critique, see Höfling, Wolfram, “§ 51 Vom überkommenen Staatshaftungsrecht zum Recht der staatlichen Einstandspflichten”, in Hoffmann-Riem, Wolfgang, Schmidt-Aßmann, Eberhard and Voßkuhle, Andreas (eds.), Grundlagen desVerwaltungsrechts, Band III (München: C.H. Beck, 2009), at p. 945.Google Scholar

19 This was originally developed in the abortion cases, but has since been extended, including to nuclear energy. German Federal Constitutional Court decisions BVerfGE 39, 1 (Schwangerschaftsabbruch I), BVerfGE 88, 203, 251 (Schwangerschaftsabbruch II); BVerfGE 49, 89 (Kalkar). See also Klein, Hans Hugo, “Die grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht”, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (1994), at p. 489 Google Scholar, and extensively Dietlein, Johannes, Die Lehrevon den grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005).Google Scholar

20 German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfG, NJW 1998, 3264 (3265) – Forests, Acid Rain.

21 Klein, supra note 19, at p. 490.

22 The notion of “rest risk” has been developed in the nuclear energy cases (Kalkar) of the GFCC: German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 49, 89, 142 et sqq.: “Ungewißheiten jenseits dieser Schwelle praktischer Vernunft haben ihre Ursache in den Grenzen des menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögens; sie sind unentrinnbar und insofern als sozial-adäquate Lasten von allen Bürgern zu tragen.” For a critique, see Hofmann, Hasso, Rechtsfragender atomaren Entsorgung (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), at p. 328–354.Google Scholar

23 German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 77, 170 (214 et sq.) = NJW 1988, 1651 – Chemical Weapons Deposition.

24 For details, see Ossenbühl, Fritz and Cornils, Matthias, Staatshaftungsrecht, 6th ed. (München: C.H.Beck, 2013), p. 44 et sqq.Google Scholar

25 BGH, Decision of 16 February 1995 - III ZR 106/93 -, BGHZ 129, 23 et sqq. = NVwZ 1995, 928 = DVBl 1995, 511 et sqq. and Ossenbühl and Cornils, supra note 24, pp. 60 et sqq.

26 See Ossenbühl and Cornils, supra note 24, p. 65 et sqq.

27 Waechter, Kay, Verwaltungsrecht im Gewährleistungsstaat (Tübingen: Siebeck/Mohr, 2008), at p. 239.Google Scholar

28 Möstl, Markus, “Art. 87 et sqq.”, in Maunz, Theodor and Dürig, Günter (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Beck: München, 2010), at para. 63Google Scholar. Different but minority opinion, Sommer, Stephan, Staatliche Gewährleistung im Verkehrs-, Post- undTelekommunikationsbereich: Zur Interpretation der Gewährleistungsnormen der Art. 87e IV und 87f I GG im Systemverfassungsrechtlicher Leistungspflichten (Berlin: Mensch & Buch, 2000), pp. 96 et sqq., at p. 171.Google Scholar

29 For dams and the protection against acts of God, like floods, see Ewer, Wolfgang, “Ersatz-, Entschädigungs- und Ausgleichsansprüche wegen Hochwasserschäden”, 55 Neuejuristische Wochenschrift (2002), pp. 3496 et sqq.,at p. 3497.Google Scholar

30 The reason is historical. Until Art. 34 entered into force, BL which shifts the liability of the official to the state, the liability of the official was a personal liability and the idea was to protect the official against claims and to uphold the risk neutrality of public administration.

31 See e.g. Ossenbühl and Cornils, supra note 24, at p. 80 with further references.

32 Ossenbühl and Cornils, supra note 24, at p. 90 et sqq.

33 Lauta, Kristian Cedervall, “New Fault Lines? On Responsibility and Disaster”, 2 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2014), pp. 137 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34 Swiss Federal Law on the Liability of the Confederation, “Bundesgesetz über die Verantwortlichkeit des Bundes sowie seiner Behördenmitglieder und Beamten (Verantwortlichkeitsgesetz, VG)” of 14 March 1958, (SR 170.32).

35 Häfelin, Ulrich, georg müller and felix uhlmann, Allgemeinesverwaltungsrecht (Zürich: Dike, 2006), at N 2244.Google Scholar

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37 Swiss Federal Court decision BGE 132 II 305 Consid.4.1 (318); BGE 123 II 577 Consid. 4d/ff (583); BGE 118 Ib 473 Consid. 2b (476/477); BGE 116 Ib 367 Consid. 4c (374); Gross, Jost, Schweizerisches Staatshaftungsrecht, 2nd ed. (Bern: Schulthess, 2001), pp. 164 et sqq., at p. 175 et sq.Google Scholar

38 Bern Association of Administrative Jurisdictions, 18.3.2004 (VGE 21 657/VGE 21234), BVR/JAB 1995, at p. 3; Queitsch, Peter, “Hochwasserschutz und Haftung im Zeitalter des Klimawandels”, Umwelt- und Planungsrecht (2011), pp. 130 et sqq., at p. 135Google Scholar; Sobotich, Viviane, Staatshaftung aus Kontrolltätigkeit imBaurecht(Zürich: Schulthess, 2000)Google Scholar; Weber-Dürler, Béatrice, “Die Staatshaftung im Bauwesen”, Schweizerisches Zentralblatt fürStaats- und Verwaltungsrecht(1997), at p. 405.Google Scholar

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40 Bern Association of Administrative Jurisdictions, 18.3.2004 (VGE 21 657/VGE 21234), (BVR/JAB, 2005), at p. 3, Consid. 4.3; Jaag, Tobias, “Staatshaftung nach dem Entwurf für die Revision und Vereinheitlichung des Haftpflichtrechts”, I Zeitschrift fürSchweizerisches Recht (2003), pp. 3 et sqq., at p. 62Google Scholar; Nützi, Patrick, Rechtsfragen verhaltenslenkender staatlicher Information (Bern: Stämpfli, 1995), at p. 292.Google Scholar

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42 Knapp, Blaise, “La Responsabilité de l’Etat en cas de catastrophes naturelles”, I Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht (1986), pp. 589 et sqq., at p. 596 et sqq.Google Scholar; Zufferey, supra note 36, at p. 428.

43 Häfelin, Müller and Uhlmann, supra note 35, at N 2298a.

44 See instead of all others, § 2 I Hessisches Katastrophenschutzgesetz (HKatSchG): a task of the states, the administrative districts (counties) and municipalities not associated with a county.

45 Bern Association of Administrative Jurisdictions, 18.3.2004 (VGE 21 657/VGE 21234), (BVR/JAB, 2005) at p. 3, consid. 5.

46 BGHZ, 27 January 1994 - III ZR 109/92.

47 Favre, Anne-Christine, “Die Haftung des Gemeinwesens am Beispiel des Schutzes vor Naturgefahren”, 6 Raum & Umwelt VLPASPAM (2007), p. 1 et sqq., at p. 7Google Scholar; BGE 120 Ib 248 Consid. 2b, 119 Ib 208 Consid. 5b, BGE 118 Ib 473 Consid. 7.

48 Wildhaber, supra note 36, at p. 413.

49 Knapp, supra note 42, at p. 599 et sqq.; Eugénie Holliger-Hagmann, “Staatshaftung: Nur in seltenen Fällen Schadenersatz”, Schweizer Versicherung of 7 November 2001, available on the internet at: <http://www.schweizerbank.ch/de/artikelanzeige/artikelanzeige.asp?pkBerichtNr=30490> (last accessed 6 February 2015); Favre, supra note 47, at p. 20; Christian Roten, “Questions choisies de responsabilité civile au sujet des intempéries”, Zeitschrift für Walliser Rechtsprechung ZWR (2001), p. 3 et sqq.

50 Swiss Federal Court decision BGE 122 III 229, 236; Swiss Federal Court decision of 18 May 2005, 4C.45/2005, Consid. 4.2.3; Brehm, Roland, “Die Entstehung durch unerlaubte Handlungen: Art. 41-61 OR”, in Berner Kommentar VI/1/3/1, 3rd ed. (Bern: Schulthess, 2006)Google Scholar, at art. 58 N 99c/d.

51 Swiss Federal Court decision of 30 August 2006, 6P.39/2006; Favre, supra note 47, at p. 199 et sqq.

52 Swiss Federal Court decisions BGE 123 II 577 Consid. 4; BGE 132 II 449 Consid. 3.3; BGE 132 II 305 Consid. 4.1; BGE 135 V 373 Consid. 2.4.

53 Häfelin, Müller and Uhlmann, supra note 35, at N 2248.

54 Häfelin, Müller and Uhlmann, supra note 35, at N 2249.

55 Wildhaber, supra note 36, at p. 409 et sqq.

56 See inter alia Van den Bergh, Roger and Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, “Member States Liability for Infringement of the Free Movement of Goods in the EC”, 156(2) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2000), pp. 381 et sqq.Google Scholar; Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, “Can Member State Liability for the Infringement of European Law deter National Legislators?” in Eger, Thomas and Schäfer, Hans-Bernd (eds), Research Handbook on Economics of European Union Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012, pp. 82 et sqq.Google Scholar; Van den Bergh, Roger and Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, “Liability of Member States for Infringement of the EC Treaty: Economic Arguments in favour of Obvious Negligence”, European Law Review, 1998, pp. 552 et sqq.Google Scholar

57 Bernhard Rütsche, “Staatshaftung für bewilligte Sicherheitsrisiken – warum die objektive Widerrechtlichkeitstheorie nicht funktioniert”, Jusletter of 4 April 2011.

58 Rütsche, supra note 57, at N 19-22.

59 Rütsche, supra note 57, at N 27.

60 Favre, supra note 47, at p. 12.

61 Seiler, Hansjörg, Risikobasiertes Recht – Wieviel Sicherheit wollenwir? (Bern: Stämpfli, 2000), pp. 206 et sqq., at p. 230 et sqq.Google Scholar

62 Ibid.

63 Favre, supra note 47, at p. 7; Swiss Federal Court decision BGE 119 Ib 208 Consid. 5b, 118 Ib 473 Consid. 7.

64 Rütsche, supra note 57, at N 22, 35 et sqq.; Swiss Federal Court decision BGE 123 II 577 Consid. 4d/aa.

65 Gerrit de Geest, supra note 41.

66 See the articles of Patricia Wiater, “On the notion of ‘Partnership’ in Critical Infrastructure Protection”, and Christopher Bovis, “Risk and Public-Private Partnerships”, in this issue.

67 See Wiater, supra note 66, part II.

68 Hood, Christopher, The Blame Game. Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011).Google Scholar

69 See for experimental evidence, Bartling, Björn and Fischbacher, Urs, “Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility”, 79 Review of Economic Studies (2012), pp. 67 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

70 E.g. the Air Traffic Controller Skyguide in Switzerland (majority state owned) and the Air Traffic Control in Germany, completely state owned.

71 Cf. LG Konstanz, supra note 11.

72 E.g. Verantwortlichkeitsgesetz, supra note 34, Art. 19.

73 BGHZ, 27 January 1994 - III ZR 109/92, para. 24. § 8 sent. 1 HKatSG states that the agencies have to guarantee an efficient protection against catastrophes.

74 BGHZ, 15 February 1979, - III ZR 108/76 -, BGHZ 74, 144, 156; permanent legal practice. This should also be an absolute requirement under Swiss law, contrary to the current jurisdiction of the Swiss Supreme Court under the objective illegality theory.

75 For Germany: BGHZ, 21 October 2004 - III ZR 254/03. For Switzerland: Wildhaber, supra note 36, p. 410 et sqq.; Bern Association of Administrative Jurisdictions, 18.3.2004 (VGE 21 657/VGE 21234), (BVR/JAB, 2005) at p. 3, consid. 5.

76 This is e.g. practiced in the IT industry for open source software. See on the embeddedness and thus crucial function of IT technology as a CI sector for all other CI sectors, Luiif and Klaver, “Governing Critical ICT: Elements that Require Attention”, in this issue.

77 For details, including case studies from the US, where design responsibility was faulty, see Thompson, supra note 8.

78 Skogh, Göran, “Risk-Sharing and Insurance: Contracts with Different Institutional Implications”, in Eger, Thomas, Bigus, Jochen, Ott, Claus and von Wangenheim, Georg (eds.), Internationalisierung desRechts und seine ökonomische Analyse. Festschrift für Hans-BerndSchäfer zum 65. Geburtstag (Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2008), at p. 297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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80 Wildhaber, supra note 36, p. 396 et sqq.

81 Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in CompensatingDisaster Victims, Issues in Legal Scholarship 2007, p. 17.

82 Another paper in this special issue “Private Liability and Critical Infrastructure” critically discusses the nuclear liability conventions from that perspective, see Michael Faure, XXX.

83 See e.g. Kaplow, Louis, “Incentives and Government Relief for Risk”, 4 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1991), pp. 167 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

84 Bernhard Waldmann, Entschädigung aus materieller Enteignungfür raumplanerische Nutzungsbeschränkungen zum Schutz vorNaturgefahren?, Sicherheit & Recht 2009, p. 159 et sqq.; Wildhaber, supra note 36, p. 405 et sqq.

85 Wildhaber, supra note 36, p. 410 et sqq.

86 See for details, Marjolein van Asselt, Ellen Vos and Isabelle Wildhaber, “Some Reflections on EU Governance of Critical Infrastructure Risks”, in this issue.