Regulation of critical infrastructure (CI) is in vogue; and accordingly every government presently develops legal governance regimes. In this paper, I try to analyse some of the present efforts to identify and govern CI. I argue that while the legal definitions introduced contribute little to the actual identification of critical infrastructure, they alter the responsibility and modus operandi of the identification. Political discretion is re-organized into administrative decisions. By relying on similar observations from risk sociology, I set out to criticize the present implementation for masking the hard political choices inherent in the work with CI, and thereby creating a dysfunctional governance regime for the protection of CI.

Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process, the new European Commission emerges as the most political yet. The Commission asks EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. The Better Regulation Package translates this political commitment into an actionable approach assuring EU citizens that the Commission will remain ‘big on big things, small on small things’. To deliver on this promise, the Commission extends the Impact Assessment system, renews its consultation procedures and adds a few institutional mechanisms so as to enhance its ‘ability to deliver’ throughout the policy cycle. But in order to do so the Commission needs to bind – and somehow control – the European Parliament and the Council, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other, in relation to their commitment to openness, participation and evidence-based policymaking. While legitimate, this attempt raises serious doubts about the compatibility of this reform with the principle of separation of powers and, in particular, that of institutional balance. A closer look at the Better Regulation Package reveals an entirely new understanding of the Commission's own prerogatives and the way it intends to exercise its legislative and regulatory powers. And this in spite of the apparent continuity between the new and old Better Regulation initiatives and the instruments it had chosen to attain the declared objectives. With a view to lay out a future research agenda on EU Better Regulation, this article identifies the most immediate questions raised by the publication of the Package and makes a first timid attempt at addressing some of them. It aims at determining how much better, if any, is the new Better Regulation Package. It does so by discussing, first, the major novelties enacted by the Commission within its own Better Regulation system and, second, those proposed in the framework of the IIA on Better Regulation.

The EU's new approach to policy evaluation is characterised by a focus on closing the policy cycle (linking ex ante and ex post appraisal) and by applying evaluation to all types of policy intervention, whether expenditure or regulatory policy. This article analyses the main features and challenges of this new approach. It first studies the conceptual and interdisciplinary challenge of such an encompassing approach to evaluation. It then assesses the new approach in the light of four key objectives of ex ante and ex post appraisal; ensuring evidence and learning; accountability, transparency and participation; policy coherence; and reducing the regulatory burden.

Critical infrastructure (CI) sees to assets that are essential for the functioning of a society and economy, as they provide public services, enhance quality of life, sustain private profits and spur economic growth. Assets of CI differ considerably, ranging from hardware such as cables and wires, through to networks for the generation and supply of energy sources. Critical infrastructures encompass many sectors of the economy, such as banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply and communications, aswell as key government services.

This Special Issue aims to develop a deeper understanding of the interplay between public and private actors in the regulatory governance of food. It starts from the observation that the traditional concept of law as command-and-control legislation and law enforcement by national governmental bodies, including inspectorates and courts, is not adequate to capture today's world of food governance. Nowadays, a broad range of public and private entities acting at national and international level seek to shape and influence the production, trade and handling of food and the risks involved therein. Drawing on data from Europe and the United States, the contributions to this Special Issue seek to unravel the intimate, yet complex ties between public and private actors within governance arrangements regulating food safety and sustainability. The articles are focused around the various phases of the policy cycle for food governance, thus addressing the interaction in stages of agenda-setting and rule-making, adoption and implementation, monitoring and enforcement, and evaluation and review. In descriptive terms, each contribution lays out the ‘who’ (actors), the ‘what’ (activity), the ‘why’ (rationale) and the ‘how’ (instruments) of food governance. In evaluative terms, the papers discuss and explain the results and challenges of the design of the public private governance arrangements. Jointly, the contributions offer original and invaluable empirical insights explaining the rise, design and challenges of mixed governance arrangements in the food sector.

Two inter–related themes provide the architecture of this better regulation package: the political tone of the initiative and the responsibility/blame game. The tone is in part the consequence of the political context surrounding regulatory policy in the EU. Whilst in the past regulatory quality standards interested only a few top civil servants and elected politicians, today there is much more political interest – and contestation, as shown by the new better regulation watchdog created by non-governmental organizations and their response to the package. The very fact that in May 2015 there was media interest in the leaked version of the chapeau communication is a novelty. Why so much attention? Among others, the rhetoric of the past few years on making the EU acquis fit for purpose and less burdensome, coupled with a growing recognition by stakeholders that impact assessment and policy evaluation are “here to stay” have turned better regulation into an additional window of opportunity for those wishing to influence EU policy–making.

The United States’ Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) revises the US Food and Drug Administration's regulatory authority. While expanding FDA's authority, the legislation replicates and relies on private systems of standards and third party audits, albeit with modifications. This article argues that public and private actors develop food safety regulations within multiple types of institutional venues, including private standards regimes, courts, congresses, and government regulatory agencies. It examines how interactions within each of these venues are shaped by stakeholders’ interests, and how the relevant subset of interactions within these venues ultimately shaped the FSMA. The article concludes by offering insights into what consequences these interactions and outcomes may have on the roles and capacities of affected stakeholders in food safety governance.

So none of the wild rumours came true in the end. Those expecting representatives of Parliament and Council on the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, or seats for ‘main stakeholders’ were likely either disappointed or relieved when the European Commission's reinforced Better Regulation package was published on 19 May 2015. As it turns out the transformation of the Impact Assessment Board, which had been in the air for a while is a partial one only, for the moment at least. Indeed, the former Impact Assessment Board got a stronger mandate and a broader reach, apart from a new name, yet it retains very much the character of an ‘in–house’ body. The long-awaited ‘external members’ of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board will be recruited as temporary agents, turning ‘independence’ to some extent into an issue of labour law.

This article addresses conceptional components of national strategies on critical infrastructure protection (CIP). In particular, it focuses on the Swiss CIP programme and its strategic components. As in other countries, Switzerland divides its national infrastructure into critical sectors, but rather distinctively it subdivides them into critical subsectors and even lists specific critical infrastructure objects in a classified inventory. The article stresses the importance of a pragmatic public private partnership in further strengthening the CI's resiliency, but also argues for a more explicit legal foundation to provide some clearer guidelines in this evolving field of collaboration.

In this article, we present some major lessons drawn from a recently completed research project. Our research dealt with ex ante evaluation, mainly impact assessment (IA).We shed new light on research questions about the control of bureaucracy, the role of IA in decisionmaking, economics and policy learning, and the narrative dimension of appraisal.We identify how our findings stand in relation to conventional arguments about these issues, and reflect on their normative implications. We finally reason on the possible extensions of our arguments to the wider field of policy evaluation, connecting IA and ex post evaluation.

Co-regulation presents an odd paradox in today's context of a shifting emphasis from government to governance. In the first place, co-regulation implies horizontal, ‘networked’ relations between government and industry. Yet at the same time, it has the hierarchical connotation inherent in regulation. The main concern addressed in this paper is what this ambiguity means for evaluations of co-regulation. What is failure here? Two contrasting interpretations of ‘governance’ are described, and a case study from the Dutch poultry sector is presented to seek explanations for failure. The two interpretations are found to provide complementary explanations for failure. This suggests that evaluations adopting a single perspective may produce all-too-easy – though misleading – conclusions.

The article accounts for the development of the European Commission's evaluation system. The article shows how internal and external developments shape an evaluation system aiming for both accountability and policy learning. In 58 interviews, several justifications for the evaluation system emerge, including four types of accountability as well as an evaluation system constructed to facilitate learning from past experience. In the system's commencement, financial and legal accountability overshadow the focus on policy learning that was perceived to be in contradiction with the two former. However, the article also demonstrates that accountability and policy learning are not necessarily opposed to each other.

The European Commission's (Commission) Better Regulation Strategy (BRS) is the major guideline for the Commission to assess legislation. It draws on regulatory impact assessment (RIA) via cost–benefit analysis (CBA), expert advice, and simplification in EU law–making. Yet, the practice of RIA by the Commission as well as in EU member states, while unavoidably incomplete, has shown avoidable shortcomings. The Commission's New Better Regulation Strategy of 2015 (NBRS) contains language that appears to address these shortcomings. If pursued consequentially, it would require an approach that resembles what has been called responsive behavioural regulation. At the same time, global initiatives from inter alia the World Bank emerge to include behavioural insights into policy analysis in the form of responsive regulation. This piece assesses potential models of RIA that can help to articulate the behavioural assumptions which are implied by NBRS as enshrined in the policy document “Better regulation for better results”. The methodological implications of the NBRS require a significant departure from the reliance on classical CBA, which is characteristic for the previous “Better Regulation” documents submitted by the Commission and which we term Old Better Regulation Strategy (OBRS).

The process risk allocation is essential for effective PPP contracts, depending on the scope of defined tasks and responsibilities between the parties in their quest to deliver public services. However, risk in critical infrastructure is sui generis risk which could not be treated contractually and transferred by the public sector to the private sector or retained by the party to an arrangement which is suited best to borne such risks.

Risk in critical infrastructure, being either internal or external, is endemic to the relevant services andwhen critical infrastructure is delivered by public-private partnerships or owned by private actors, the treatment of such risk merits a third-party approach. Such third-party could be an industry in itself, such as insurance, re-insurance or hedge fund insurance bond finance, or a sector / industry approach which related to the owners/operators of the relevant infrastructure, by means of collective apportioning and mitigation of risks associated with the failure of providing services fromsuch infrastructure. The most innovative way of treating risk of critical infrastructure remains in the discretion of EU Member States, in the form of integrating costs related to risk assessment and security measurers to protect critical infrastructure into tariff arrangements of relevant services. In such manner, the enduser / consumer of services ensures and collectively insures their delivery against any type of risk which is not quantified and determined as part of corporate arrangements between the state and the private sector provider of services.