In July 2001, a few years after my first encounter with the intersection of criminal law and international law at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), I asked the following question at a lecture at Melbourne University:

While the political will to pursue war criminals was first lacking, is there, as some seem to fear, a danger that it will become relentless? If so, what effect will that have on the integrity of the complex aspirations and methodologies of criminal law as an instrument of social control in a democracy?

After 11 September of the same year, the question acquired added acuity as I assumed that it would be not just war criminals but also international terrorists that the criminal law framework, domestic and international, would now be pursuing. I obviously was gravely mistaken in my concerns. The pursuit of terrorist suspects seems to have little to do with criminal or international law as we know it. Hence the real questions: What is it then about? Under what legal framework, if any, does it purport to operate and who is accountable to whom?

In this paper, I assert that the prohibition on the death penalty brings with it an obligation on abolitionist States to refrain from assisting the use of the death penalty in retentionist States. By considering the law on complicity and State responsibility, the obligation to protect under international human rights law, and the practice of States, I argue that although there are jurisdictional issues and although the death penalty is not prohibited under general international law, an obligation to refrain from being complicit in the death penalty is developing in international law.

In this article the scope for dialogue between UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights is considered in theory and in practice. Having demonstrated that meaningful dialogue does take place in certain circumstances, the author considers the impact of dialogue and questions whether or not there can be any further expansion in dialogue whilst avoiding negative outcomes such as confusion over the creation of human rights norms and a loss in legitimacy for national courts adjudicating upon human rights issues.

The protection of foreign investment by way of treaties and arbitration has recently suffered attacks on its legitimacy. The article turns on human rights concerns in this context and analyses what legal mechanisms and arguments can be employed to ease the tension between investment protection and human rights. Harmonization in this regard finds two key entry points: first, at the inter-State level of investment agreements, and secondly, at the intra-State level of the foreign investment contract. At the first level, human rights considerations, particularly concerning economic and social rights, can be brought to bear by way of their systematic integration qua treaty interpretation. The article subjects this inroad to close scrutiny but concludes that, while it possesses considerable merits and has attracted a certain attention (albeit still more in the academic world than in that of arbitration practice), it remains an approach ex post, possibly leaving excessive discretion to arbitrators. Thus, at the second level, already at the pre-investment stage, efforts should be made to recast investors' “legitimate expectations” under foreign investment contracts by including a “human rights audit” as part of the due diligence to be conducted by the investor and the host State, to survey the host State's human rights treaty commitments and domestic methods for implementing these commitments. The primary objective of this audit would thus be to fully include the prospective host State's international obligations as part of the body of applicable law and thus create a better map of the landscape of an investor's “legitimate expectations”.

This article examines the controversies over and implications of the 2010 French ban on the covering of the face. It carries out an internal critique of the new law and, in a broader European context, questions its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. It argues that the ban has strayed away from the confines of laïcité (the separation of State and religion in the public sphere) by encompassing activities and people who in no way emanate from the State. Far from being a flagship of a secularism—à la française—or a French way of life, the ban—it is argued—goes against entrenched French legal traditions and unduly conflates the concept of national identity at the cost of individual liberties, thus forgetting the true goal of secularism: the conciliation of different beliefs and values. Assuming that the defence of secularism is nevertheless (for reasons we will explore) upheld by the European Court of Human Rights as a legitimate aim pursued by the law, the French ban, it is argued, is likely to fall foul of European requirements for lack of proportionality.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture entered into force on 22 June 2006. It establishes a Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture that has authority to visit places of detention and to assess the conditions of that detention as a way to reduce the incidence of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Additionally, States parties are required to set up complementary national preventive mechanisms. This article explores both how these mechanisms established under the Optional Protocol could operate in the context of the detention of refugees and/or asylum-seekers, which is an increasingly common occurrence in many parts of the world, as well as whether they add value to existing international mechanisms that are already available in this field. It examines the purported applicability of the Optional Protocol to four refugee/asylum situations, namely detention at airports and other border zones; immigration (or administrative) detention, including semi-open (or semi-closed) asylum centres; closed refugee camps; and extraterritorial processing or holding centres. Reviewing definitional, jurisdictional, and practical issues that may impact on the success or otherwise of these new preventive mechanisms, this article concludes by making a number of recommendations to aid their work in the refugee/asylum context.