Religion and nationalism are not only two distinctive but also closely related concepts when it comes to nation-building. Their role in language policy and linguistic nationalism is pervasive. Today, in Turkey, two religious movements of the same origin play a key role in linguistic nationalism and decision-making in language policy: the Gülen movement and the Med-Zehra movement. These two non-governmental affinities are important groups in the Nur movement. The Gülen movement is supportive of Turkish nationalism and thereby Turkish language and identity, while the Med-Zehra group emphasizes Kurdish identity and separatism. This study makes a comparison between the two movements and investigates in detail their role in language policy and linguistic nationalism.

This article aims at an empirical verification of prosecutors’ partisan behavior through a case study based on the Russian President Yeltsin and Putin periods. According to Gretchen Helmke's original theory of strategic defection, dependent judges may occasionally check their principal, the executive leadership, by withdrawing their support in the course of an electoral cycle. However, a modified theory of strategic defection can be readily applied to civil-law prosecutors’ behavior in new presidential democracies, where several presidents dominated that office during most of their tenure but experienced prosecutorial defection in their final phase. Russia provides a textbook case for examining the modified theory in relation to prosecutors’ partisan behavior against an incumbent president. Meanwhile, this paper uses within-case analysis based on a qualitative method, because the methodological approach can have more advantages in discovering whether prosecutors acted ‘really’ strategically when an incumbent government was outgoing in Russia, and in further explaining a pattern of prosecutors’ partisan attitudes in new presidential democracies, through the modified version of Helmke's theory.

Since the 1950s, Taiwan and China have utilized foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. After Taiwan's forced withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971, diplomatic and aid-giving competition with China became more intense. As a result, Taiwan's and China's struggles to gain supporters have been reflected in foreign aid strategies. Taiwan's bid for the UN and the WHO, and the issue of diplomatic recognition empirically demonstrate the utilization of aid to obtain diplomatic support from recipient countries, and, frequently, any decisions are heavily influenced by the competition it experiences with China. Theoretically, this highlights an important relational framework for analyzing foreign aid decisions – particularly the management of foreign relations of small states or middle powers simultaneously influenced by greater powers and aid recipient states.

Using data from ICDF and related reports, we observe geographically concentrated patterns in the distribution of Taiwan's aid recipients from 1988 to 1997 – mostly in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In contrast to China's foreign aid which emphasizes infrastructural development, the spirit of Taiwan's economic development aid programs often took the form of technical cooperation. However, a high percentage of aid went to countries with diplomatic ties to Taiwan. With civil society development and increased international activities of Taiwanese NGOs in humanitarian relief and development projects after 2000, we find a new emerging set of geographical aid distribution patterns that expand beyond countries that recognize Taiwan. In addition, while the process of incorporating civil society into foreign aid work was initiated by the ICDF the following decade, Taiwanese NGOs have increasingly demonstrated autonomous international agendas, funding, and direction, as well as the formation of civil society alliances that work on common international development issues.

This paper extends understanding of the relationship between media use and attitudes toward democratic values. We employ the two-step estimation approach to examine the relationship between media use and attitudes toward democratic values as well as consequential association with political participation. The empirical results show that media use to obtain news information is positively related to attitudes toward democratic values. The findings also note that attitudes toward democratic values are positively associated with engagement in politics. The results support the argument that media use is significant for shaping citizens’ attitudes toward democratic values by providing information about public affairs and expanding citizens’ understanding about democratic politics. As such, media use facilitates democratic socialization and leads to more involvement in political behaviors.

Under conservative Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Japan has embarked upon a high profile ‘Womenomics’ foreign policy agenda to highlight Japan's official development assistance (ODA) contributions to women's empowerment worldwide. This paper examines the puzzle of why such an avowedly conservative government would pursue a feminist foreign policy agenda. The paper finds that Japan's Womenomics diplomacy cannot be explained simply by materialist or domestic political explanations, but is best understood as a strategic campaign stemming from elite concern about Japan's national identity and esteem about its status in the world. Through Womenomics diplomacy, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempts to construct Japan as a leader on women's rights and gender equality in response to the twin stigmas of Japan's treatment of wartime ‘comfort women’ and perennial low rankings on international indexes of gender equality.

The current efforts of Moscow and Tokyo to unblock the territorial impasse are complicated by some barriers of a socio-psychological character, including mutual mistrust and contradictory images of past events. Public opinion surveys reveal predominant vectors in Russo-Japanese relations, which the authors believe strongly correlate with the evolution of the contradictory images. Apparently, these images surprisingly exhibit interrelated ‘mirror’ dynamics connected with the independent variable – events happening in bilateral relations. Apparently, these images surprisingly exhibit interrelated ‘mirror’ dynamics connected with the independent variable – events happening in bilateral relations. The authors also investigate how public opinion has a real impact on politics and relations between states. In the authors’ opinion, Russia and Japan definitely do not have major unresolved problems in their bilateral relations, with the exception of the territorial problem. However, why is the public so suspicious of Russia? Can the territorial dispute be the only reason? It is far from that. The analyzed arguments give grounds to believe that it is very difficult for Japan and Russia to find a mutually acceptable solution, as their relations are not free from suspicion and mutual mistrust which are deeply rooted in the history of their relations. It will be much easier to overcome the mistrust and, accordingly, to reach agreement on the territorial issue when they manage to calmly analyze the historical grudges, understand their nature and origin, and realize that this is history, which has no contemporary value.

Scholars of distributive politics in Japan have shifted from large items in the general account budget to more geographically targeted spending known as intergovernmental transfers. However, a portion of the funds sent to prefectural governments are ostensibly determined by the apolitical ‘financial index’. However, even though the financial index is included in most studies of intergovernmental transfers, only slight attention focuses on the financial index and its determination. Using prefectural level data on intergovernmental transfers, economic indicators and electoral support for the LDP, this research shows that the LDP possesses strong incentives to manipulate the index and that politics is a significant determinant of the financial index.

Israel seeks to have good relations with most members of the international community, and establishes friendly relations with as many states as possible. As part of the Asian continent, Israel has been interested from its inception in good ties with China and India in particular. In this regard, besides India and China, another important Asian country with which Israel's relations are flourishing is Japan. Over recent years, the two countries’ relations have steadily progressed. Cooperation between the two countries could be productive, and both Israel and Japan have much to gain from developing a relationship. In this context, this article firstly gives a brief summary of Israel's developing relations with two important countries of Asia, India and China, then tries to explain the nature of the developing relations between Israel and Japan, and aims to point out possible future areas of cooperation.

The US and Japan, despite their shared reputation as leading donors for international development, remarkably varied in their foreign aid policy for HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike the US, who initiated and increased global AIDS funding dramatically, Japan was lukewarm in its contributions. I claim that the distinctive pattern depends on how the pandemic was domestically framed and understood. The policy commitment was more likely when the internationally shared idea (international norms) of threats requiring immediate international cooperation was congruent with the domestic perception of the epidemic. The research undertakes a comparative examination of the determinants of the distinctive domestic perceptions of the two cases, including the number of individuals infected with HIV, the attitude and role of the media, and the civil society organizations dealing with HIV/AIDS. They played significant roles as intervening variables that conditioned domestic diffusion or internalization of the international norms for foreign aid policy development. The US had a favorable domestic condition based upon the relatively large number of those infected with HIV, a media that adopted a constructive approach, and active civil society organizations associated with the disease. In contrast, in Japan the number of HIV cases was lower, the media had a distorted view of the epidemic, and civil society organizations were not strong enough to offer much support until the early 1990s.

It has been one of the most debated puzzles in the study of political economy of terrorism whether economic development can curb terrorism. In Xinjiang, a multi-ethnic region in West China, it is widely believed that higher income levels can decrease the likelihood of terrorism conducted by Uyghur separatists or Islamic extremists. However, the county-level data for the year of 2013 show that better economic performance may not work as is expected. Instead, empirical evidence indicates that income is positively associated with the probability of terrorist attacks, and the effect is statistically significant. Projects that are aimed at boosting local economic growth result in a flood of migrants, and the local Uyghurs are disadvantaged in the employment market. Consequently, economic grievances will be generated. Some, but not all, Uyghurs have a shared motivation to resist, but tight social control in the region constrains the form of resistance, in the sense that neither mass protests nor armed rebellion are feasible. Terrorist attacks that come at a lower cost become a preferable choice. In addition to economic grievances and tight control, external factors also help to boost terrorist activities in Xinjiang, but more empirical and field research is needed before we could clarify how external factors, such as the international jihadist movement, interact with local conditions and result in terrorism in the region.

Subnational diplomacy has come to life in India. Although still nowhere near in the same league as their counterparts in North America, Europe, parts of Asia, and even other developing countries, subnational governments (SNGs) in India are increasingly engaged abroad through involvement in regional and global affairs, questioning the central government on international matters, seeking foreign direct investment, organizing trade fairs and investment summits, leading economic missions, and hosting visiting dignitaries to showcase their jurisdiction's economic potential. These new and emerging actors on India's foreign affairs landscape are pluralizing and decentralizing India's foreign policy, albeit in a limited way and on small scale, as all states and territories are not as yet actively involved in foreign affairs. The paper argues that management of India's external relations is no longer informed or conducted simply by a select group of diplomats, high-ranking political leaders, and other specialist foreign policy advisers in New Delhi. Today subnational actors are becoming an essential component in India's foreign affairs. They are joining the huge traffic of SNGs from countries around the world that are linking with counterparts and others across national borders to serve the interests of local constituencies. It is a trend that is changing not only diplomatic roles, but also the nature of economic and political relationships among government actors worldwide.

This study examines the effects of personality traits on voter turnout in South Korea. While it has been demonstrated that no direct relationships exist between personality traits and voter participation in South Korea, we argue that personality traits have indirect effects on turnout through such attitudinal factors as political interest, political efficacy, partisanship, and ideology. Using data from Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) 2012, we find that political interest and political efficacy play an important role in mediating the relationships between personality traits and voter turnout in South Korea. However, contrary to our expectations, there is either weak or no evidence on the mediating role of partisanship and ideology in the relationships between personality traits and voter turnout. To sum up, our findings provide some support to the indirect relationships between personality traits and voter turnout in South Korea and imply that the impacts of personality traits on voter participation vary by country or geographic region.

China's growing assertiveness in strengthening its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea has arguably intensified friction and deepened tension between the rival claimant States. In sharp contrast to the strong reactions of its fellow ASEAN claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia traditionally has been less critical and more inclined to downplay China's perceived emotive actions. This subtle foreign policy orientation is likely to remain unchanged in the immediate future. Malaysian leaders are aware of the need to continue adopting a more cautious but pragmatic approach to counter China's increasingly aggressive actions in the Spratly Islands. Because of the significant economic and political benefits derived from its close relationships with China, Malaysia's policy preference is aimed to avoid jeopardizing such relations. However, the growing presence of Chinese military vessels in Malaysia's waters in recent years has forced the latter to reassess its foreign policy approach, which might include adopting a more assertive stance towards China. Set against this backdrop, this article aims to give an exploratory insight into Malaysia's external behaviour and actions in response to China's recent growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea. To this end, the aim of this article is achieved through a twofold approach. First, it examines Malaysia's overlapping claims to maritime features and waters with China, with the focus on the Spratly Islands group. Lastly, the article provides an explorative insight of Malaysia's rationalist stance, particularly under the current administration of Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, in response to China's aggressiveness. It also examines the motivations, intentions, and basis of this external posture.

In March 2011, Japan suffered a massive earthquake. The resultant tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor and it was later revealed that the reactor was actually in a state of meltdown. While it is still unclear how many people will be affected, both mentally and physically, by the radio-active fallout, the extent to which our lives are subject to the unimaginable risks of scientific technology has become patently clear. This paper strives to clarify the risks of scientific technology in relation to instrumental reason, critical thinking, plurality, and subsequently, the significance of the public realm in contemporary world affairs, with a specific focus on the Fukushima incident. In so doing, I shall introduce arguments regarding scientific technology by such thinkers as Arendt, Heidegger, and Horkheimer as well as the Kyoto School philosophers. This paper also focuses on the issue of morality in order to address the notion of the lack of critical thinking and the disappearance of the public.

This study examines the effects of civic consciousness and civil disobedience on individual attitudes toward, and participation in, contentious politics. Using the newly collected survey data on civic consciousness and civil disobedience in Taiwan in 2015, this study finds that both civic consciousness and civil disobedience are significantly associated with individual support for and engagement in contentious politics. Specifically, people with strong civic consciousness and civil disobedience are more likely to support the Sunflower Movement and take part in contentious political activities such as rallies, marches, and strikes. The findings imply that as the ideas of civic consciousness and civil disobedience prevail in a democracy, the public will be more likely to choose to use contentious political activities to express their opinions instead of institutional and legal approaches when the government is unable to respond to public needs in a timely manner.

Values and elements of popular culture play an important role in shaping and implementing the foreign policy of Iran. In this paper, using content analysis and after explaining the characteristics of Iranian identity, the author seeks to investigate the implications of Iranian social beliefs on foreign policy. In other words, the author sets out to explore whether the perceptions and attitudes of Iranian identity at different historical periods have been the basis according to which Iranian politicians have followed the same model or not? For this purpose, three major components, the influence in the regional area, xenophobia, and conspiracy theorythat are complementary in nature, have been selected. Research findings illustrate that the long history of societies like Iran has been the raison d'etre for the recurrence of social beliefs and values in various political eras of such societies.

Since the financial crisis of 2008–9, how a state can play a more active role in correcting market failure has become a central topic in political economy. Thus, academia is again discussing state capitalism seriously. Contemporary state capitalism assumes state intervention in markets is becoming more multifaceted. Consequently, traditional state-owned enterprises exist alongside new government-favored actors, such as privately owned national champions and sovereign wealth funds, intervening in markets. This coalition helps the state achieve its security, political, economic, social, and nationalistic goals more efficiently. Its growing power in markets also heralds the return of state capitalism. This paper uses state capitalism theories to re-interpret China's food security governance. The three preliminary findings are as follows. First, China's food security governance is typically operated under state capitalism, which has successfully managed China's food availability, though not without some corruption, but has weakened its food accessibility. Second, using state capitalism to manage China's food safety has been impeded, so the effects remain to be seen. Third, state capitalism has successfully improved the stability of the food supply and demand in China, but its agricultural business branching-out strategy has worried the international community and should be observed further.

This research study attempts to map out the career network of selected members from the Politburo and Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by adopting social network analysis techniques, calculating various network indices, and quantifying the value and importance of each position. The purpose of this research is to uncover the crucial positions leading to the CCP's political and military power center, as well as to how these positions interrelate. The results show the following. First, in the Jiang Zemin era (Jiang's era), Politburo members were mainly promoted from the central party committee or Central Government. Secondly, in the Hu Jintao era (Hu's era), key members from administrative regions started to step into the power center. Third, in the era of Xi Jinping (Xi's era), most Politburo members were promoted directly from administrative regions, especially from the coastal areas, such as Shanghai and Guangdong province. The research also indicates that being a military commander for Military Regions appears to provide experience necessary for promotion, whilst being an officer at the central military departments, such as a (Deputy) Chief General of Staff or Commander of Armed Services, is considered a major stepping stone. Although the succession trend defined by the innovative analysis of this research might not match the fixed model used by the CCP for its succession plan, under the circumstances of probable further institutionalization of the CCP, a quantified analysis of network position could be considered a more promising method of prediction.

With a multilevel governance structure, China and the EU both face the task of preventing lower level political entities from impeding capital mobility. In China, licensing barriers, as the main protectionist measure, are sometimes created by local authorities, leading to restrictions on inter-provincial establishment of companies. Moreover, whether or not to create such barriers depends on various factors. In the EU, a major effort has been undertaken to facilitate cross-border establishment and any remaining barriers mainly arise from national regulatory autonomy in some areas. In terms of further facilitating company mobility, while the strong judicial mechanism in the EU has tackled some of the remaining barriers, China's weak administrative and judicial systems seem unable to prevent the creation of licensing barriers. This paper argues that precise rules defined by the legislative authority offer a better prospect of regulatory effectiveness for China whose administrative capacities are weak and courts are not independent. More specifically, legislative decision making in the setting of inter-provincial establishment should be taken at the central level. Moreover, national legislators should precisely and clearly prescribe which authorities are empowered to control inter-provincial establishment, and under what conditions.