The dominant view in proliferation research holds that security guarantees from nuclear patrons reduce client states’ incentives to pursue nuclear armament. Yet in South Korea, public support for indigenous nuclear capabilities remains high despite strong trust in US extended deterrence. Drawing on the “better-now-than-later” logic from preventive war theory, we argue that this support reflects public forward-looking pessimism about the security environment, shaped by perceptions of the relative decline of the US and North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities. Analysis of the 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll shows that concerns about systemic power shifts and pessimism about future inter-Korean relations are significantly associated with support for nuclear armament. South Korean public assessments of US extended deterrence and North Korea’s military threat do not align with conventional alliance theory expectations that high trust in extended deterrence should reduce support for nuclear armament. These findings underscore the need for reassurance strategies that address enduring alliance credibility.

Throughout much of the twentieth century, Japan maintained a “special relationship” with Myanmar, often bucking the policy approach of Western countries to provide financial and political support to the country’s military leaders. Following the February 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar, however, Japan’s policy approach toward the country notably shifted in response to domestic and international pressures. Utilizing declassified documents from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other Japanese-language sources, this study examines how Japanese diplomacy toward Myanmar evolved in response to the coup. Through a structured assessment of Japan’s geopolitical strategy, bureaucratic politics, and the influence of informal actors, the study demonstrates how these interconnected factors prompted Tokyo to “rethink” certain aspects of its relationship with Myanmar while maintaining distinctive elements of its previous approach.

Conservative parties and politicians are often caught in a dilemma regarding immigration policies. Business interest groups and xenophobic populist forces both support conservative political parties but expect fundamentally different immigration policies. Japan is a rare case among advanced democracies that has experienced neither large-scale immigration nor the emergence of xenophobic populism. Yet, Japan’s conservative government, facing the reality of a rapidly aging and declining population, has begun to loosen immigration policy. We analyze the ruling party politicians’ policy positions on foreign worker intake and demonstrate that their views have shifted in a pro-foreign-worker direction, especially among legislators representing rural areas that have seen a sharp increase in foreign residents.

This article examines legislative waffling behavior—where legislators reverse their position between bill sponsorship and floor voting—in the South Korean National Assembly from 2004 to 2020. Using multilevel logistic regression analysis of 21,292 bill-legislator observations across four legislative terms, we develop a novel theoretical framework that disaggregates waffling into three distinct strategic types: dissent (voting against), abstention, and no-show (strategic absence). Our findings challenge US-based theories by revealing that minority party members in Korea exhibit significantly higher rates of waffling across all types, with the effect particularly pronounced when bills are passed as chairman’s substitutes in majority-controlled committees. We demonstrate that ideologically extreme legislators are more prone to waffling, while main sponsors maintain greater consistency throughout the legislative process. The analysis of committee control structures reveals complex dynamics where minority party members face heightened waffling pressures even in committees they control, suggesting that formal institutional authority cannot fully overcome broader power imbalances in consensus-based systems. These findings highlight how Korea’s distinctive institutional features—including proportional distribution of committee chairs, mixed electoral system, and consensus-oriented legislative culture—create fundamentally different incentive structures for legislative behavior compared to majoritarian systems, underscoring the importance of developing context-specific theoretical frameworks for comparative legislative studies.