Governments, Like People, Function in ways that enhance their perceived self-interest. Effective narcotics control is in the best interest of the United States for at least three reasons.

First, reducing the available supply of illicit narcotics (potentially) can reduce the incidence and prevalence of abuse by US citizens. For example, by making drugs relatively hard to find and expensive to use, supply-reduction efforts might successfully discourage potential users from experimenting with drugs and risking future chronic, intensive involvement. Moreover, it can be argued that control measures may be an important deterrent in motivating current drug users to seek treatment and find gainful employment (Moore, 1988).

Second, reducing the supply of illicit narcotics may reduce the level of organized crime and lawlessness in the United States. An effective supply reduction program presumably can bring success in stopping trafficking organizations from supplying illegal goods and services; seizing their ill-gotten wealth; punishing their acts; prosecuting them for corrupt practices; and weakening or eliminating these groups as threatening criminal enterprises.

The Congress of The United States exerts greater influence over foreign policy than do its counterparts in other nations. This influence extends to formulation of US policy regarding control of the international narcotics trade, a subject on which the Congress has chosen to assume a leading role. The formal policymaking role of the Congress in this area is embodied in legislation on international narcotics (including appropriation of funds) and in oversight. The Congress also exercises its influence in an informal way through consultation, unofficial advice, public education, and legislative prodding in the drafting and conduct of that policy.

The congressional role in narcotics policymaking is notably affected by its committee structure, in which numerous committees may exercise some degree of jurisdiction over narcotics-related issues. As a result, not only has there been widespread involvement of the Congress in formulating narcotics policy, but there has also been considerable fragmentation of that policy as congressional initiatives have been compartmentalized within the jurisdictional domains of various committees.

In The Face Of The Unsuccessful Efforts of law enforcement agencies (including the Coast Guard) to staunch the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States, Congress and the public have been demanding that the military increase its role in the nation's anti-drug campaign. These demands vary in scope. The minimum demand is that the military provide more logistical support and intelligence data. Another, which was approved by Congress in 1988, is also to give military personnel powers of search, seizure, and arrest outside the land area of the United States. Some also advocate giving civilian police powers to the military to patrol the national borders, including ports of entry. In May 1988, the US House of Representatives voted to demand that the military “seal the borders” to drug traffic within 45 days, an effort which would require both naval and border interdiction, and the Senate voted overwhelmingly to expand the role of the military in the anti-drug campaign. The most extreme demand has come from Representative Arthur Ravenel, Jr. (R-SC) who has called for the military shoot-down, on sight, of any aircraft suspected of smuggling drugs.

The US Policymakers Working on the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act have clearly understood that going after the suppliers of narcotics is only part of the war on drugs; until US domestic demand is diminished, it will be difficult to bring this lucrative and illicit multinational business under control. There is, however, general agreement that something must be done about supply and that interdiction of drug shipments to the United States is only one means. The drug supply war's major focus is the growing, production, and shipment of narcotics within the Third World countries who are the suppliers, particularly in Latin America (Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia head the list).

Although there have been occasional attempts to “Americanize” anti-drug operations in Latin America (with the US government assuming drug enforcement functions as it did in Bolivia with Operation Blast Furnace in 1986), the major US option is to support the build-up of the Latin American governments' own drug-fighting capabilities by supplying funds, training, and equipment.

Drug Abuse and Attempts to Control the flow of illicit narcotics have come to pervade US relations with the Third World in recent years. The drug issue carries substantial potential for conflict and mutual recrimination between North and South. The main dmg-consuming countries are rich and industrialized; the main drug-producing countries are poor and predominantly agricultural. The drug trade generates a transfer of resources from North to South and has gained a powerful economic foothold in some Third World countries. Producing countries and consuming countries blame each other for the accelerating drug traffic and advocate, respectively, demand-side and supply-side solutions. US programs to control drug cultivation and production overseas often impinge on nationalist sensitivities. Moreover, political elites in some Third World countries view anti-drug crusades as imposing significant economic and social costs as well as creating new and formidable political challenges.

Polttical Conflicts between Bolivia and its peasantry over the production and distribution of the coca leaf during the 1980s is the focus of this essay. The first section describes several of Bolivia's comparative disadvantages (among Andean producer nations) for waging effective coca leaf control programs. Following is an analysis of the interplay and results of specific statepeasant conflicts during the 1982-1988 period of civilian democratic rule. To give a Bolivian contextual backdrop to these conflicts, aspects of the national political culture which shape the terms and conditions of the struggle over controversial drug-related issues are explained. A final section presents a brief analysis of the Chapare region's prospects for a successful coca leaf eradication program.

Explanations for the Bolivian government's ineffectual campaign against the coca leaf and cocaine industry range from its status as a weak state to its fragile and deteriorating economy (Healy, 1986). Bolivia's political system holds the world record for changes in government by way of the coup d'etat.

Peru is a Priority Theater in The US War against drugs in that it produces more coca for export to the United States than any other Latin American country. The Huallaga Valley, a remote area about 200 miles northeast of Lima on the eastern Andean slopes, is one of the world's most fertile coca-growing regions. This article focuses on what is known about Peru's coca industry, and the anti-drug efforts that have been undertaken by the US and Peruvian governments. Under President Alan Garcia, elected in 1985, the Peruvian government has been usually cooperative with US anti-drug programs; some explanations for this collaboration will be suggested.

Despite the Garcia government's cooperative stance, the results of Peru's war against drugs have been similar to results elsewhere: governments have won some battles, but they are losing the war. Perhaps the most important question raised by the ' Peruvian case is whether the United States should give a higher priority to anti-drug efforts or to counterinsurgency; US policy regarding Peru has appeared to do the latter.

Honduras Has Emerged as a cocaine transshipment point between Colombia and the United States. One informed source suggests that as much as fifty tons of cocaine have moved through the country during the last fifteen months. This paper examines the politics of drug trafficking in Honduras. Special attention is given to the relations between drug trafficking and the Honduran political environment, the emergence of a new “powder elite, ” and the manner in which US and Honduran authorities are addressing these problems.

One of the hemisphere's poorest countries by almost all standards of development, Honduras has a population of about 4.5 million people and an area the size of Tennessee. Unlike neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador where a national oligarchy has enhanced its wealth through an extensive coffee industry, Honduras first emerged in the international economy through its foreign-owned banana enterprises which still are a leading source of foreign exchange.

The Headlines Had a Tone of sensationalism in Trinidad's Sunday Guardian: “ Drug Barons Taking Over Big Business: 'Dirty’ Money is being laundered into the system” (Guardian, 1988).

Trinidadians, however, were hardly in a mood to accuse the normally staid Trinidad Guardian of sensationalism; the doings of drug barons is the subject of almost every dinner, cocktail party and informal conversation. Visitors are taken on tours of the new multimillion-dollar mansions springing up in formerly placid and genteel neighborhoods. Their massive walls and remote control cameras stand in stark contrast to the gingerbread quaintness of the adjoining structures (Interviews, 1988). But architectural divergency is the least of the contrasts so annoying to Trinidad citizens. What the Guardian calls the “satanic plot,” carried out by men of “prominence and respectability, ” is especially grating as the depressed economy has everyone else tightening belts or, worse, going into receivership. The court system is overwhelmed with drug and drug-related cases, and the main thrust of communityoriented philanthropy is the establishment of drug rehabilitation centers.

US Chief Executive Ronald Reagan Declared WAR on drugs in February 1982, and pledged his administration to the task of curtailing the burgeoning drug epidemic in the United States. To accomplish this urgent “national security” objective, the federal government rapidly increased expenditures for narcotics control programs during the ensuing seven years of his two-term presidency, reaching $4.3 billion annually in 1988. Enthusiastically backing the president's initiative, the US Congress approved tougher national drug legislation, widened the US military's involvement in the war, supported the administration's drive to intensify interdiction efforts along US borders, and expanded USdesigned eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement programs in foreign source and transit countries. First Lady Nancy Reagan launched her “Just Say No” campaign, flooding the American educational system and the public media with anti-drug messages. Ostensibly, all sectors of American society enlisted in the war on drugs and the country began mobilizing for battle.