Colonial and neo-colonial situations are characterised by an absence of power-sharing, though those who have the political power may allow token participation by others. Tokenism exists in many aspects of life, though typically minority-group members enjoy greater economic and adminstrative rights than political and legislative rights. In the last analysis, the governmanet is not accountable to such minorities because they are not part of the electorate.

The general pattern of agricultural performance in Africa south of the Sahara is rather bleak. Various publications sketch a picture of decreasing output, food shortages, rising imports, soil erosion, famine, and even mass starvation. The annual rate of change of the total agricultural and food production for sub-Saharan Africa compares unfavourably with the already disquieting figures for the developing world in general. The data reflect a serious situation which is all the more alarming because of the enormous importance throughout the continent of the farming sector. Indeed, this is the single largest contributor to G.D.P. in many African economies: more than 80 per cent of the labour force in almost half of these countries are employed in agriculture, and for most of them it provides over 50 per cent of their export earnings.

Great-Power rivalry in Africa is among the legacies left by European statesmen who, a century ago in Berlin, carved up the continent and whole nations within it into tidy colonial compartments, several with frontiers still in dispute. Russians and Americans attended that inglorious conference but stayed out of the scramble for territories that followed. It is one of history's ironies that Moscow and Washington emerged, with proxies to help them, as leading contestants in the contemporary struggle for position, presence and power in Africa.

During the 1970s, enthusiasts for Africian – Arab solidarity emphasised the potential benefits of political co-operation and economic partnership between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Middle East. The interest in such a relationship gained momentum among African and Arab Head of States, culminating in their summit meeting in Cairo in March 1977. It is now time to examine both the basis of the euphoria and the prospects, or lack of them, for the development of a comprehensive and durable relationship between the contiguous regions.

The pattern of rapid economic growth in the Ivory Coast since the early 1950s has been frequently described with some hyperbole, by foreign experts and Ivorian politicians, as an economic ‘miracle’. While most African nations, with the exception of the oil-exporters, have taken a rough ride on the economic roller-coaster during the past two decades, and while some like Guinea, Ghana, and Uganda, have followed a steadily downward trajectory, the economic fortunes of the Ivory Coast have improved consistently.

During 1984 the citizens of Botswana will return to the polls for their fifth national election, the fourth since independence in 1966. While not an unusual exercise in Botswana, this will be a significant occurrence in an independent Africa where elections themselves have become increasingly rare and problematic, and still more so within a multi-party system which amounted to more than simply rubber-stamping party decisions. While other states in Africa concern themselves with the establishment of one-party régimes or with the need return to civilian rule, Botswana has had a successful series of multiparty elections uninterrupted by military coups. This article explores Botswana's experience, with attention to parties, the electoral system, voting trends, and prospects for the future.

The past decade has seen an increase in the scope of relationships, both political and economic, between Africa and the United States. These vary with the complexion of the government in power, though some would say that this was more in emphasis than in substance, others definitely not. It is felt by many Africans, nevertheless, that the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights has now been downgraded by the present Reagan Administration and that, instead, the geopolitics of U.S.–U.S.S.R. rivalry, and the economic importance of developing the private sector at the expense of bilateral or multilateral aid, have been moved to the fore.

Some have tried to explain corruption in the Third World by reference to anachronistic traditions and to the special pressures on officials in developing countries. In this article, I argue that, at least in the case of Nigeria, the roots of corruption go deeper, to a materialism and a political fragmentation that are the products of a moment in development. After a schematic review of the relevant literature, I examine the causes of Nigerian corruption, and conclude with the suggestion that the future of good government depends on an expansion of the private economy.

A common problem in primary-producing countries is that commodity price instability causes substantial variation in government revenues. A conceptually simple yet rarely used domestic policy measure intended to smooth annual fiscal receipts is the establishment of a development stabilisation fund. The need for such a fund in Zambia and its modus operandi are discussed in the context of a review of budgetary performance since 1965. A simulation suggests that substantial smoothing could be achieved, but that the fund could not overcome a prolonged depression of copper prices such as occurred in the years after 1975.

Since the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States in 1975, its acronym has become well known, even though ‘E.C.O.W.A.S.’ still means little more than a synonym for ‘West Africa’ and a symbolic tribute to the ideals of African unity. The Community has certainly witnessed a growth of its bureaucracy and institutions, but the limited co-operation actually achieved has been based on strengthening links which were developed in the region since the early 1960s rather than on the transfer of state prerogatives to Community organs on specific issues.

Among the sober assessments of U.S. interests in South Africa by the Rockefeller Commission one finds a rare lapse into wishful thinking. It is the contention that the option of Major economic sanctions against the Republic ‘must be kept in the U.S. policy arsenal’. Since this distinguished body recommended against expansion and new entry into South Africa (but also against disinvestment), the commitment of American and European firms in South Africa has grown substantially. U.S. investment alone increased by 13 per cent in 1981. The 1,200 British companies, followed by 375 American and 350 West German firms, with a total foreign investment of R30 billion in 1982, seem to confirm the South African propaganda of stability and growth. These interests constitute an effective veto block against meaningful disengagement.

It has become something of a truism to assert that most African states are characterised by a high degree of social pluralism, a low level of national integration, and marked inequalities in the distribution of resources between regional and ethnic communities. In these circumstances, communal cleavages tend to be viewed as potential sources of tension and thus as threats to the stability of central administration. It is generally assumed that governments will, therefore, pursue policies designed to inhibit the political salience of the cleavages.

The widespread perception that South Africa is moving inexorably towards violent confrontation has led to increasing attention being paid to consociationalism as providing a potentially workable framework whereby the White minority's present monopoly of political power could be nudged towards a democratic form of rule in a reasonably just, evolutionary, and non-violent manner. Not surprisingly, most such speculation has been undertaken by those of either a liberal or a genuinely conservative (as opposed to reactionary) bent who, whilst certainly evincing some apprehension that racial polarisation could result in the overthrow of the existing capitalist order, register rather more concern that any prolonged violent conflict would entail not only the sheer human misery that is the inevitable accompaniment of war, but would also be massively destructive of any long-term prospects for political stability, economic growth, racial harmony or, more simply, any form of reasonably decent society.

The distribution of land-use rights both defines and shapes African political economy. Control over land can be utilised in various ways to accumulate capital for either autonomous or comprador investments in the domestic economy. The acquisition of official titles to land concomitantly affords the holder opportunities to exploit those who do not possess this valuable resource. For these reasons, command over land offers the state a powerful means of regulating access to the dominant class. This study focuses on the ways in which allocations of statutory certificates of occupancy have affected the on-going process of class formation in two northern States of Nigeria: Kano and Bauchi. We are particularly interested in identifying, through information collected from a sample of application files, those elements of the population who were admitted and denied access to the dominant class through the land-allocation process during the late military-rule period, 1976–9.

On 24 February 1966, Apolo Milton Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda, marched into a meeting of his Cabinet with an armed escort, arrested five of his Ministers, and suspended the 1962 independence constitution he had solemnly sworn to protect. Since that fateful day Uganda has known no peace. Indeed, factional divisions and the ambitions of politicians, followed by the military dictatorship of Idi Amin after his coup d'état in 1971, soon reduced the country to howling anarchy.

Our intention is …to put Afro–Arab cooperation on the map as a dimension of international economic cooperation which all countries, especially the rich industrial nations, must reckon with. Arab aid and cooperation efforts should be in a context of a new world economic order, based on equality and justice.

In most traditional African societies, the relationship of the individual to the community is clearly defined from birth. Each child soon comes to understand his special relationship to his extended family, and to the historical founders of his ethnic group. Hereditary lines trace ancestral origins, and names reflect ties to past generations as well as those yet to come. From the very beginning the child understands that he is not alone, and that he is an integral member of a distinct group with traditional responsibilities and expectations. He perceives himself not as a solitary individual who must discover his own meaning in life, but rather identifies with the legendary history and social values of his clan. These inherited ties to the past, present, and future prove to be of tremendous benefit to the individual, and provide a shared sense of order and security.

While the importance of the rôle of formally qualified high- and middle-level technical personnel in the development process in Africa has been repeatedly underlined since the early 1950s, relatively little empirical research has focused on the historical evolution and present constitution of the occupations which embody these skills. As a contribution to such an analysis, this case-study examines the determinants of the institutional provision of Kenyans with engineering technician qualifications, and their subsequent employment and utilisation. In other words, we are concerned with the relationship between the supply of, and demand for, one group of skilled individuals. Although formulating the problem in this way may, at first sight, appear to be narrowly economistic, this framework provides a methodologically useful starting point for a multi-disciplinary analysis.

This study focuses on the relationship between political symbols and the legitimation of national leadership in Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We are particularly interested in ways in which their leaders have used myths and symbols in an attempt to foster or enhance the legitimacy of their régimes in the face of severe economic and political crises.

In less-developed countries generally, and Africa in particular, centralised forms of political and economic organisation were until recently the norm. But over the past 15 years, this form of government has come under attack, and excessive centralisation is now viewed as a primary contributor to prevailing high levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Various forms of decentralisation – the shifting of responsibilities and resources from central to sub-national units and actors – have been proposed as the necessary corrective mechanisms. Algeria, Kenya, the Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia have been among the African countries which have implemented programmes aimed at strengthening the personnel, finances, and freedom of manoeuvre of non-central agencies and governments.