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The Physical Proximity of the Executive Branch to the Legislature: How close is too close? The Case of Australia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

Andréa Cullen*
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar, Independent Scholars Association of Australia
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Abstract

Type
Dynamics in Legislative–Executive Relations: Global Outline for 2019–2024
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Political Science Association

Australia has a parliamentary political system with a majoritarian electoral system for its Commonwealth House of Representatives. This Spotlight article discusses how the physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature contributes to the former exercising power over the latter. In Australia, the executive branch is housed within the legislature building (Fewtrell Reference Fewtrell1985) by “deliberate design” (Macintyre Reference Macintyre2008, 48). That is, the executive and legislative functions of government are carried out in the same building. Ester (Reference Ester2011, 127) described this accommodation arrangement as “unprecedented” and one “that shows scant regard for ensuring the [legislature’s] constitutional sovereignty is underpinned through physical separation.”

The physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature has tangible and intangible effects on the Australian Parliament’s ability to carry out its legislative and scrutiny functions. The tangible effects include the ability of the executive branch to leverage its significant physical presence to exert undue pressure, especially on backbenchers. The intangible effects include creating a prevailing and dominant culture of the executive branch, which overshadows the legislature. The accommodation of the executive branch in the building over an extended period normalizes its presence and influence. It uses its appropriation of space in the building to exert influence and power as a normalized way of operating.

This article discusses how this arrangement encourages and empowers the executive branch to behave in ways that would be considered unconventional or unconscionable. Specifically, I address the question of how the physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature influenced the dynamics of legislative–executive relations in Australia in 2019–2024, following general elections held in May 2019 and May 2022 to elect members to the 46th (July 2, 2019, to April 11, 2022) and 47th (July 26, 2022, to present) Parliaments of Australia, respectively.

The 46th Parliament Session

The Coalition of the Liberal and National Parties controlled the Lower House during that convocation of the Parliament. Examples of the tangible effects of the physical proximity being used by the executive branch include reported instances of it determining the terms of engagement with backbenchers. On these occasions, the executive branch used its physical presence and ease of access to exert pressure and influence on backbenchers, collectively and individually. Notable examples include (1) the treasurer approaching a member in their office to guarantee support of the government in motions of confidence and votes on appropriation bills on the floor of the House; (2) live texting of the conversation taking place through a closed door to a mainstream news outlet; and (3) the summoning and escorting of backbenchers who were contemplating crossing party lines and voting with the other side on important votes to meetings with the prime minister in the executive wing (Karp Reference Karp2021; Tingle and Elton Reference Tingle and Elton2021).

There are two key examples of intangible effects during the 46th Parliament. First was “the secret appointments to ministries.” In 2022, it was revealed that Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison appointed himself to five ministerial portfolios in 2020–2021 while in office. The appointments were not announced, the prime minister did not inform the Cabinet, and most of the ministers already in these portfolios were unaware. This executive exercise of power was considered unchartered territory.

The Solicitor-General found that this unprecedented exercise of executive power, although not illegal, to “the extent that the public and the Parliament are not informed of appointments that have been made under S64 of the Constitution, the principles of responsible government are fundamentally undermined” (Grattan Reference Grattan2022). Furthermore, it was observed that the undermining was not dependent on whether the prime minister exercised any or all of the additional powers but rather on the action of the appointments and their secrecy.

Second was the formation of a “National Cabinet.” The 46th Parliament was witness to the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic and its trajectory. The direction and coordination of Australia’s response was managed through the formation of a National Cabinet—a committee of first ministers of the Commonwealth, states, and territories. It was established by the prime minister on a footing mirroring a “war cabinet,” except that it did not include the Federal Opposition Leader. Its establishment was regarded as a new frontier for the exercise of unchecked executive action and power in that “the National Cabinet emerged to occupy a new space for executive action, operating without accountability linkages back to any legislature” (Mills Reference Mills2020, 9). Also, it did not meet the traditional requirements of a Cabinet (despite being referred to as one), and it materialized devoid of any sound governance structure (Mills Reference Mills2020; Murphy Reference Murphy2020).

The 47th Parliament Session

The Labor Party has control of the Lower House during the 47th Parliament, which is still current at the time of writing. Intangible effects of the physical proximity have been prevalent during this Parliament. For example, shortly after the Parliament commenced, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese exercised his discretion under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act of 1984 to reduce the personal staff allocations to each of the newly expanded 16-member crossbench from four to one. Affected crossbenchers and political commentators argued that this was an attack on democracy and that a reduced office would make it significantly more difficult for crossbenchers to properly scrutinize legislation and hold the government to account (Coorey Reference Coorey2022; Madden Reference Madden2022).

The new government stated that it would respect Parliament, its scrutiny, and its legislative role. In an address to the National Press Club in 2023, Leader of the House Tony Burke proclaimed that the government would be reticent to use guillotine motions that shut down debate. Yet, in March 2024, the Lower House rammed through legislation without any robust scrutiny. This action markedly reduced the role of the legislature; furthermore, the government was unable to adequately explain why the bill was urgent (Worthington Reference Worthington2024).

In 2023, the government introduced a requirement for stakeholders who were seeking input into proposed government legislation to sign nondisclosure agreements. This coincided with the government proposing to change workplace-relations laws. The requirement was used again in 2024 related to changes to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and the introduction of fuel-efficiency standards (Worthington Reference Worthington2024).

Conclusion

The physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature can influence the dynamics of legislative–executive relations. When the executive branch is housed within the legislature building—as is the case in the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia—such proximity enables it to exert undue influence and undermine a legislature’s ability to carry out its legislative and scrutiny functions in tangible and intangible ways.

The physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature can influence the dynamics of legislative–executive relations.

In assessing the influence of the physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature during the past five years in the Australian Parliament and its overall effect on legislative–executive relations as compared to prior years, it is clear that the executive branch continues to dominate the policy process in the country.

However, regarding the magnitude of this dominance, the effects of physical proximity on legislative–executive relations have intensified during the tenure of the past two sessions of the parliaments compared with the previous one. That is, the executive branch has used the physical proximity in a more emboldened way to influence the legislative and scrutiny functions of the Australian Parliament. This physical proximity of the executive branch to the legislature and sharing the building weakens the legislature’s mastery of its own precinct. The legislature building and its precinct should be the exclusive domain of the legislature.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The author declares that there are no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

References

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