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Du paradoxe libéral-parétien à un concept de métaclassement des préférences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Herrade Igersheim
Herrade Igersheim*
Affiliation:
CNRS et CEPERC, Universite de Provence, 29 avenue Robert Schuman, 13621 Aix-en-Provenoe Cedex 1, France.
*
(e-mail: igersheim@cournot.u-strasbg.fr)
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Résumé

Notre contribution défend la thèse selon laquelle le paradoxe libéral-parétien de Sen plaide en faveur de l'élaboration d'un nouveau formalisme en termes de métaclassement des préférences. Il s'agit d'enrichir la structure traditionnelle des préférences par la prise en considération des motivations et des valeurs individuelles comme vise à le prouver l'analyse des tentatives de résolution du conflit Pareto-liberté que nous opérons tout d'abord. Puis, après avoir montré que le fait de tenir compte des motivations individuelles justifie un recours au concept de métaclassement des préférences, nous suggérons une solution au paradoxe libéral-parétien intégrant cette notion.

Summary

Summary

The purpose of our paper is to argue that Sen's liberal paradox compels to choose a new formalism in terms of metaranking of preferences. One should complete the traditional structure of preferences by taking individual motivations into account. We show first that all the endeavours to resolve the impossibility of the Paretian liberal aim at expressing the values and motivations of the individuals. We then argue that the concept of metaranking of preferences is justified by this purpose. Finally, we submit a resolution of the impossibility of the Paretian liberal according to this notion.

Keywords

Paretian liberal paradoxcollective choicemetaranking of preferencesD6D7paradoxe libéral-parétienchoix collectifmétaclassement des préférencesD6D7
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 73 , Issue 2 , 2007 , pp. 173 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2007 

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