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What is exactly the problem with panpsychism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Cyriel M. A. Pennartz*
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, 1098 XHAmsterdam, The Netherlands. c.m.a.pennartz@uva.nl; sils.uva.nl/content/research-groups/cognitive-and-systems-neuroscience/cognitive-and-systems-neuroscience.html?cb

Abstract

Merker et al.'s critique calls for a deeper analysis of panpsychism. In principle, the concept of integrated information can be applied to photodiodes and subatomic particles, but I suggest the main obstacle is the lack of any evidence to confirm the presence of consciousness. Also MRW's perspectivalist theory illustrates the difficulties in synthesizing a full-fledged theory of consciousness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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