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Moral externalization and normativity: The errors of our ways

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

P. Kyle Stanford
P. Kyle Stanford*
Affiliation:
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697. stanford@uci.eduhttp://www.lps.uci.edu/lps_bios/stanford
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Abstract

I respond to the many thoughtful suggestions and concerns of my commentators on a wide variety of questions. These include whether moral norms form a unified category, whether they have a distinctive phenomenology, and/or whether moral normativity is a cultural construct; whether moral externalization is necessary for correlated interaction or human prosociality; precisely how such externalization generates correlated interactions among prosocial agents; and whether there are any convincing alternative explanations for it.

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e119
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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