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Explaining consciousness: From correlations to foundations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2016
Abstract
What does it take to explain the roles of consciousness for action and action for consciousness? This commentary claims that efficient functional explanations must meet two epistemological requirements: independent description of explanandum and explanans, and foundational explanation of their mutual relationship. It is argued that Morsella et al.'s target articledoes not fully meet these requirements.
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- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016
References
Graziano, M. S. A. (2013) Consciousness and the social brain. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prinz, W. (1984) Modes of linkage between perception and action. In: Cognition and motor processes, ed. Prinz, W. & Sanders, A. F., pp. 185–93. Springer.Google Scholar
Prinz, W. (2003a) Emerging selves: Representational foundations of subjectivity. Consciousness and Cognition
12:515–28.Google Scholar
Prinz, W. (2012) Open minds: The social making of agency and intentionality. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Target article
Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis
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Author response
Passive frame theory: A new synthesis