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Explaining consciousness: From correlations to foundations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Wolfgang Prinz
Wolfgang Prinz*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, 04103 Leipzig, Germany. prinz@cbs.mpg.dehttp://www.cbs.mpg.de/staff/prinz-10359/@@index.html
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Abstract

What does it take to explain the roles of consciousness for action and action for consciousness? This commentary claims that efficient functional explanations must meet two epistemological requirements: independent description of explanandum and explanans, and foundational explanation of their mutual relationship. It is argued that Morsella et al.'s target articledoes not fully meet these requirements.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e193
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

Graziano, M. S. A. (2013) Consciousness and the social brain. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prinz, W. (1984) Modes of linkage between perception and action. In: Cognition and motor processes, ed. Prinz, W. & Sanders, A. F., pp. 185–93. Springer.Google Scholar
Prinz, W. (2003a) Emerging selves: Representational foundations of subjectivity. Consciousness and Cognition 12:515–28.Google Scholar
Prinz, W. (2012) Open minds: The social making of agency and intentionality. MIT Press.Google Scholar